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PUSH, PULL, AND SPILL: 
A TRANSDISCIPLINARY CASE STUDY IN 
MUNICIPAL OPEN GOVERNMENT 
Jan Whittington, Ryan Calo, Mike Simon, Jesse Woo, 
Meg Young & Peter Schmiedeskamp† 
ABSTRACT 
Municipal open data raises hopes and concerns. The activities of cities produce a wide 
array of data, data that is vastly enriched by ubiquitous computing. Municipal data is 
opened as it is pushed to, pulled by, and spilled to the public through online portals, 
requests for public records, and releases by cities and their vendors, contractors, and 
partners. By opening data, cities hope to raise public trust and prompt innovation. 
Municipal data, however, is often about the people who live, work, and travel in the city. 
By opening data, cities raise concern for privacy and social justice. 
This article presents the results of a broad empirical exploration of municipal data 
release in the City of Seattle. In this research, parties affected by municipal practices 
expressed their hopes and concerns for open data. City personnel from eight prominent 
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departments described the reasoning, procedures, and controversies that have accompanied 
their release of data. All of the existing data from the online portal for the city were joined 
to assess the risk to privacy inherent in open data. Contracts with third parties involving 
sensitive or confidential data about residents of the city were examined for safeguards 
against the unauthorized release of data.  
Results suggest the need for more comprehensive measures to manage the risk latent 
in opening city data. Cities should maintain inventories of data assets, produce data 
management plans pertaining to the activities of departments, and develop governance 
structures to deal with issues as they arise—centrally and amongst the various 
departments—with ex ante and ex post protocols to govern the push, pull, and spill of data. 
In addition, cities should consider conditioned access to pushed data, conduct audits and 
training around public records requests, and develop standardized model contracts to 
protect against the spill of data by third parties.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Cities hold considerable information, including details about the daily 
lives of residents and employees, maps of critical infrastructure, and records 
of internal deliberations. Cities are beginning to realize that this 
information has economic and civic value. The responsible release of city 
information can result in greater efficiency and innovation in the public and 
private sector. New services are cropping up that leverage open city data to 
great effect.1 Activist groups and residents are also placing increasing 
pressure on state and local government to be more transparent.  
There has been little research into the growing area of municipal open 
data.2 Cities are beginning to open their data in a way that has never been 
seen before, and these releases may raise privacy concerns. Scholarly and 
media attention has focused at the federal level toward the activities of the 
National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
and the White House.3 Despite the attention given to federal agencies, most 
personally-identifiable data is collected much closer to home, by the 
governments of the cities where we live, work, and play.4 
 
 1. See, e.g., Kathleen Hickey, AppStore Gives Governments Access to Municipal Apps, 
GCN (June 4, 2014), http://gcn.com/articles/2014/06/04/granicus-appstore.aspx; Angus 
Loten, Entrepreneurs Shape Free Data into Money, WALL ST. J., Jan. 9 2014; Jason Slotkin, 
City Living: There’s an App for That, COMPUTERWORLD (Jan 11, 2013), http://www
.computerworld.com/article/2494114/mobile-wireless/city-living--there-s-an-app-for-that
.html; Geoffrey A. Fowler, Apps Pave Way for City Services, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2010), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704658204575611143577864882. 
 2. For example, Maxat Kassen has observed: 
[I]t is not yet clear how the potential of the open data concept can be 
realized at the local level as there has been no analysis of current projects 
so far. The concept is still in its infancy, and in fact it gained a political 
meaning primarily after the launch of the official U.S. government data 
portal in 2009. Later, similar data projects were initiated at the local level. 
Maxat Kassen, A promising phenomenon of open data: A case study of the Chicago open data 
project, 30 GOV’T INFO. Q. 508, 509 (2013); see also Anneke Zuiderwijk & Marijn Janssen, 
Open Data Policies, Their Implementation and Impact: A Framework for Comparison, 31 
GOV’T INFO. Q. 17, 17 (2014) (“[V]ery little systematic and structured research has been 
done on the issues that are covered by open data policies, their intent and actual impact. 
Furthermore, no suitable framework for comparing open data policies is available.”). As 
recently as 2011, the International City/County Management Agency national survey of 
e-Government did not include questions on open data. Donald F. Norris & Christopher 
G. Reddick, Local E-Government in the United States: Transformation or Incremental 
Change?, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 165–175. 
 3. E.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE, NOTHING TO HIDE: THE FALSE TRADEOFF 
BETWEEN PRIVACY AND SECURITY (2011); Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The 
FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). 
 4. See generally Bill Schrier, Chapter 28: Toads on the Road to Open Government Data, 
in OPEN GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION, TRANSPARENCY, AND PARTICIPATION IN 
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This Article is a cross-disciplinary assessment of an open municipal 
government system. We are a team of researchers in law, computer science, 
information science, and urban planning that worked hand-in-hand with 
the City of Seattle, Washington to understand its current procedures 
around data processing from each of our disciplinary perspectives. Based on 
this empirical work, we have generated a set of recommendations to help 
the city manage risk latent in opening its data.  
Seattle makes for a great case study. With a population of 650,000 and 
growing rapidly, Seattle is mid-sized, but not so enormous as to be 
unwieldy. It is a highly educated, technically savvy city and is often highly 
ranked among its peers on measures of innovation, creativity, and 
technology.5 Seattle was one of the first cities to embrace an open data 
initiative.6 Its leadership has publicly stated a need to achieve a balance 
between privacy and transparency.7 During our research, we found 
encouraging signs in what Seattle is already doing and its willingness to 
adopt best practices, and identified areas for additional improvement. 
A. THE MUNICIPALITY IN FOCUS 
Municipalities govern a wide array of activities, from police services to 
building permits to parks and recreational services and facilities. City 
governments collect and process large amounts of information to support 
these activities, often with the help of third party contractors. Some of this 
data is confidential, requiring special handling for security purposes, while 
other is not confidential, but nevertheless contains sensitive details about 
residents and employees. If taken out of context or made publicly available, 
this data could bring about harms to privacy or social equity.  
Rapid technological changes pose significant complications for 
municipalities seeking to govern data in the public interest. Municipalities 
are eager to become “smart cities” by adopting information technologies 
 
PRACTICE 305, 305–313 (Daniel Lathrop & Laurel Ruma, eds., 2010); Kassen, supra note 
2, at 509; Peter Conradie & Sunil Choenni, On the barriers for local government releasing 
open data, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. S10, S10–17 (2014). 
 5. E.g., Boyd Cohen, The 10 Smartest Cities In North America, CO.EXIST (Nov. 14, 
2013, 7:08 AM), http://www.fastcoexist.com/3021592/the-10-smartest-cities-in-north
-america. 
 6. Press Release, Socrata, Inc., Socrata Strengthens Open Data Market Leadership 
(Jun. 28, 2011), http://www.socrata.com/newsroom-article/socrata-strengthens-open
-data-market-leadership. 
 7. Press Release, City of Seattle Office of the Mayor, City of Seattle Launches 
Digital Privacy Initiative (Nov. 3, 2014), http://murray.seattle.gov/city-of-seattle-launches
-digital-privacy-initiative. 
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that promise more effective and efficient delivery of services.8 Ubiquitous 
computing includes mobile micro-video cameras, utility meters that discern 
the use of appliances, and technologies for detecting and tracking residents’ 
whereabouts, energy use, and other information. Each of these technologies 
has the potential to create real-time, continuous data feeds. As the 
technologies of data collection, processing, and storage become ever more 
advanced and potentially intrusive, local governments face the challenge of 
adapting policies and guidance about privacy and social equity to changing 
circumstances. In the absence of clear criteria and procedures, municipal 
agents may resort to ad hoc decision-making. In a federated system of 
governance, the cumulative implications of multiple data releases may have 
consequences not anticipated by any individual unit, including the ability to 
reconstruct the identity of an anonymous resident.  
The data generated by municipalities is of interest to many commercial 
entities, which seek to use the data for purposes that are not necessarily 
aligned with the public interest. In March 2014, the FTC published a report 
introducing the data-broker industry, which is built around the collecting, 
processing and reselling of data about individuals.9 Brokers aggregate data 
from public and private sources, index the data into detailed profiles of 
persons, households, and neighborhoods, and sell it to private and public 
buyers. Eight of the nine data brokers participating in the FTC study 
reportedly relied on information supplied by government to identify and 
profile individuals.10  
B. PURPOSE, THEMES, AND CONTENT 
Our research explored both the mechanisms and consequences of 
municipal data releases. Our results provide a snapshot of activities and their 
 
 8. See generally Michael Batty, Smart Cities, Big Data, 39 ENV’T & PLAN. B: PLAN. 
& DESIGN, 191 (2012); Rob Kitchin, The Real-Time City? Big Data And Smart Urbanism, 
79 GEOJOURNAL 1 (2014); Mike Weston, ‘Smart Cities’ Will Know Everything About You: 
How Can Marketers Cash In Without Becoming Enemies of the People?, WALL ST. J., July 12, 
2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-cities-will-know-everything-about-you-
1436740596. Weston writes: 
[M]unicipalities and governments across the world are pledging billions to create 
“smart cities”—urban areas covered with Internet-connected devices that control 
citywide systems, such as transit, and collect data. Although the details can vary, the 
basic goal is to create super-efficient infrastructure, aid urban planning and improve 
the well-being of the populace. 
Id. 




 10. Id. at 15. 
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potential implications in a city that is striving to reap the benefits and avoid 
the pitfalls of data release. 
Cities share data in three basic ways: push, pull, and spill. Cities “push” data 
when they publish databases through online or other portals. Residents and 
others “pull” data out of the city with public records requests. And cities 
“spill” data, through accidental exposure, malicious data breach, and the 
distribution of data by vendors, contractors, and partners. We use the push, 
pull, and spill taxonomy as a unifying theme throughout our analysis and 
recommendations.  
Whether pushed, pulled, or spilled, the release of municipal data has 
many consequences. Three questions guided our exploration of the 
consequences of municipal data releases. Does the availability of open data 
increase public trust in the effective and efficient delivery of public services? 
Under what technological, legal, and other circumstances can municipalities 
govern the release of open data to meet the public need for privacy? What 
harms could municipal open data lead to, including issues of disparate racial 
or social impact, physical insecurity, or harm to consumers or the 
marketplace? We approach these questions across multiple methods and 
sections of this Article. 
The rest of the Article proceeds as follows: We discuss our specific 
approach to investigating the city’s use of municipal data in Part II. Part III 
summarizes our findings. Part IV consists of seven recommendations for 
Seattle—and other cities interested in improving open data practices. We 
recommend: (1) conducting an inventory of data assets, (2) requesting each 
department to submit a data management plan, (3) establishing nested 
governance structures to deal with issues as they arise, (4) establishing ex 
ante and ex post protocols for push, pull, and spill, (5) conducting an audit 
and training around public records requests, (6) exploring the prospect of 
conditioned access to some city data, and (7) developing a standardized 
model contract for data vendors. We understand that Seattle is actively 
pursuing some or all of these recommendations even as of this writing. 
Finally, the Article closes with Part V outlining future work suggested by 
our analysis and findings. 
II. OUR APPROACH 
There is little empirical work on municipal open data practices to date. 
However, exploratory research is not without guideposts. A sophisticated 
and expanding literature investigates the private sector’s use of information 
technology. This literature builds theoretical and empirical accounts and 
examines how those uses may compromise social norms and features of the 
economy; features that are prefaced upon the privacy of personal 
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information, racial and social equity, and the preservation of the public trust 
in digital or online transactions.11 This Article seeks to begin a similar line 
of research aimed at the public sector, starting with municipalities. As 
subjects of research, municipalities are recent entrants into an ongoing, 
multidisciplinary conversation about the benefits and pitfalls of data 
collection, use, release, retention, commercialization, and security. This 
characterization is especially apt when the aim of research is to orient policy 
to the public interest.  
As the subject of this particular study is municipal open data, we focus 
on the release of data by or from municipalities.12 The push, pull, and spill 
taxonomy assisted us in designing research that would explore current 
practices while highlighting the potential future effects of such practices on 
public trust, privacy, and social equity. This required a mixture of research 
methods, each suited to a likely area of contest or hazard.  
Our research methods and findings are described in four parts: 
 Qualitative Assessment 1—Key Stakeholders:  
We begin with a sense of the hopes and concerns of the 
parties affected by municipal practices. For this, we 
carried out focus groups on the topic of pushed, pulled 
and spilled municipal data, with several types of key 
stakeholders in the Seattle community. We relay our 
findings.  
 Qualitative Assessment 2—The City:  
We then discuss how Seattle itself handles data. We 
conducted interviews with city personnel involved in the 
release of data. Interviews spanned push, pull and spill: 
the intended purpose and use of open data by 
departments, the circumstances of public disclosure 
requests, and the involvement of departments in 
 
 11. See, e.g., Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Privacy and Security: Myths and 
Fallacies of “Personally Identifiable Information,” 53 COMM. ACM 24 (2010), 
https://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/shmat_cacm10.pdf; Alessandro Acquisti & Jens 
Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY & 
PRIVACY, 26 (2005); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701 (2010); Ryan Calo, Digital Market 
Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan 
Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 606 (2014). 
 12. Other stages in the lifecycle of data matter and, though not central to this study, 
are just as worthy of research. The results of this study suggest promising future avenues 
for research in these related areas, including, for example, the potential for upstream 
decisions about collection and retention to be predicated on the downstream effectiveness 
of policies restricting the uses of data. 
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contracts with third parties for information-intensive 
services. The results indicate the types of data collected 
and used, the incentives that departments have to release 
datasets (or not), and the ways in which releases are 
modified to preserve privacy and social justice. 
 Technical Assessment—Open Data Analysis:  
We conducted technical analyses of the datasets already 
pushed to the City’s open data portal in order to 
understand how the City uses the portal and to 
investigate the extent to which the City’s current 
practices could potentially compromise privacy and 
social justice.  
 Legal Assessment—Vendor Contracts:  
Having identified, in departmental interviews, many 
contracts with third parties involving sensitive or 
confidential data about residents of the city, we 
examined these contracts for the kinds of safeguards one 
might expect in order to prevent, for example, 
unauthorized spills of this data. 
As a collection of exploratory assessments, these research activities 
provide a broad array of insights into the role of the municipality in the 
release of data. 
III. FINDINGS 
This part of the Article presents extensive findings on how a city 
generates and releases municipal data. This is a vast area for research. As 
other authors have explained, government departments are created to 
perform services that markets do not or should not provide, or are difficult 
or impossible for residents to provide for themselves.13 For example, 
municipalities organize to provide regulatory functions to curb the many 
ways in which the for-profit, self-interested incentive structure of the 
private sector will “as if by an invisible hand” lead markets to fail to serve 
the public interest.14 Within their jurisdiction, municipalities operate 
monopoly or monopolistic markets for several goods (e.g., water, electricity, 
roads, lighting), which are often provided through contracts with firms on 
behalf of residents. In negotiating these contracts, municipalities have 
 
 13. See Shrier, supra note 4, at 311. 
 14. See id. (quoting ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES 
OF THE WEALTH OF THE NATIONS 423 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776)). 
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substantial leverage on the public’s behalf, reducing the transaction costs 
that would have accrued if members of the public were left to organize and 
bargain on their own.15 This bargaining power makes cities powerful market 
players—an untapped source of influence over privacy and security policy, 
as we discuss below. Municipalities also provide intergovernmental 
coordination: the geospatial area or jurisdiction of any given municipality is 
layered with the jurisdictions of several other governmental entities (e.g., 
special districts, counties, states, and the federal government). With such 
eclectic aims, municipalities can appear to be labyrinths of data production 
and release, bewildering in their complexity.  
As a consequence of the enormity of the research task—as well as the 
inherent subjectivity in terms such as “open” or sensitive—we were forced 
to make certain assumptions and choices that we try to highlight through 
our findings. We also lay out an agenda for future work that reflects the 
realization that there is much more to do. Nevertheless, we attempted to 
convey and engage with both the breadth and depth of city data in our 
analysis.  
Unlike physical assets, in Seattle as in many other cities, there is no 
central catalog of datasets and metadata. This research was conducted in 
partnership with the City of Seattle. The participation of departments in 
interviews and in the collection of key documents was critical to the success 
of this research in depicting, in situ, the governance of municipal open data.  
A. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT I: KEY STAKEHOLDERS 
Though our subject is municipal data, our backdrop is the people it 
affects. This section discusses our qualitative analysis of stakeholders’ 
perceptions of open municipal data, particularly its downstream impacts. 
We understand that cities want to be responsive to their constituents, and 
 
 15. As Ronald Coase explains, illustrating with the case of the harmful effects suffered 
by many from the smoke exhaust of a factory:  
[D]irect governmental regulation will not necessarily give better results 
than leaving the problem to be solved by the market or the firm. But 
equally there is no reason why, on occasion, such governmental 
administrative regulation should not lead to an improvement in 
economic efficiency. This would seem particularly likely when, as is 
normally the case with the smoke nuisance, a large number of people are 
involved and in which therefore the costs of handling the problem 
through the market or the firm may be high.  
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960). On the 
application of Coase’s theory to privacy harm through transactions with personal 
information, see generally, Hoofnagle & Whittington, supra note 11, and Jan Whittington 
& Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Unpacking Privacy’s Price, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1327, 1331 n.9 (2012). 
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we endeavored to gain a sense of the hopes and fears of residents and others 
around open municipal data. We designed the research question for this 
component to be open-ended and as inclusive as possible of the range of 
issues that stakeholders may find relevant to the initiative. Through focus 
groups and interviews, we asked users for their hopes, concerns, and 
expectations for Seattle’s open data initiative.  
1. Methods: Data Collection and Analysis  
a) Research Design and Sampling 
The data collection for this study included the following stakeholder 
groups: (1) Seattle residents in general, (2) civic hackers, (3) privacy 
activists, (4) city employees, (5) an academic, (6) a legal advocate, and (7) 
industry representatives.16 Our hope was to talk to those who directly use or 
would potentially use open municipal data, as well as those who work on 
closely related issues. Thus, with the exception of the group of “residents in 
general,” respondents were largely familiar with the topic at the time of the 
focus groups and interviews.17 
Seattle’s local tech economy offers unique access to major industrial 
players, tech hobbyists, and activists. Data collection for this study was 
conducted with these existing organizations. For example, the “civic 
hackers” focus group was conducted with a local hobbyists group which 
meets weekly to build apps of local interest using open data. The focus 
group with privacy activists was conducted with members of a community 
activist organization focused on privacy issues, like the use of police 
surveillance cameras. The four industry representatives interviewed came 
from relevant departments in three large local corporations. 
Most sampling for the study was purposive, based on respondent 
membership in relevant organizations or interest in the study.18 Civic 
hackers, privacy activists, the legal advocate, academic, and industry 
representatives were contacted directly for their relevance to the study. 
 
 16. We adopt the Value Sensitive Design definition of stakeholders: “Direct 
stakeholders refer to parties—individuals or organizations—who interact directly with the 
computer system or its output. Indirect stakeholders refer to all other parties who are 
affected by the use of the system. Often, indirect stakeholders are ignored in the design 
process.” Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Jr. & Alan Borning, Value Sensitive Design and 
Information Systems, in EARLY ENGAGEMENT AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES: OPENING UP 
THE LABORATORY 55, 73 (2013). 
 17. We used a focus group format to collect data from the first four stakeholder types 
listed. Due to scheduling constraints, data from a legal advocate, academic, and industry 
representatives was based on interviews. 
 18. As part of the University of Washington Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval for this study, demographic information about respondents was not collected. 
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Members of the general public were recruited via fliers and Craigslist.19 Our 
hope for the city employees focus group was to speak with workers on the 
“front-line”—police, fire, waste management, and others who drive fleet 
vehicles; constraints within the city made this infeasible. The city employees 
who participated were largely administrative staff; nevertheless, this group 
was more sensitive to potential privacy issues than we had expected.  
b) Data Collection 
Data collection for this study was based on focus groups and interviews. 
The focus group format was piloted twice to make it more neutral. Each 
focus group had 7–10 members and lasted 60–120 minutes. We used this 
format for residents, privacy advocates, civic hackers, and city employees.20 
Focus groups are well-suited for understanding unobservable phenomena 
like attitudes.21 As a method, focus groups present a risk of respondent bias 
and group-think; our research design took measures to minimize these 
risks.22 
Focus groups began with a 10-minute introduction from the moderator 
covering relevant background information. The moderator introduced the 
city’s open data portal, the types of data currently available on it, and data 
types that the city has made available. The moderator introduced the 
Washington State Public Records Act (PRA), and its strong value on 
government transparency.23 The PRA is a state law that establishes broad 
rights for state residents to request public records. It is intended to promote 
government transparency and accountability. The moderator explained that 
while the PRA requires the reactive release of data in light of a public 
disclosure request, open data is proactively released and not mandated. The 
presentation discussed how data is anonymized by removing its identifying 
 
 19. This group was compensated $15 for their time. No other respondent was 
compensated. Perhaps because of this means of recruitment, respondents for the general 
public group happened to be people experiencing instability in employment and housing. 
 20. In addition, we also interviewed four industry representatives, a legal advocate, 
and an academic. 
 21. For a detailed discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of focus groups as a 
research method see DAVID L. MORGAN, FOCUS GROUPS AS QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 
13–17 (2d ed. 1996). 
 22. See Jenny Kitzinger, Qualitative Research. Introducing Focus Groups, 311 BRIT. 
MED. J., 299–30 (1995) (“The method is particularly useful for exploring people’s 
knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but 
how they think and why they think that way.”). See generally Jenny Kitzinger, The 
Methodology of Focus Groups: The Importance of Interaction Between Research Participants, 16 
SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 103 (1994). 
 23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56 (2011) (Public Records Act). 
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attributes, and under what circumstances data subjects may be re-identified, 
if any. Focus groups were conducted with a minimal moderation approach.24  
c) Data Analysis 
Transcripts of the focus groups and interviews were analyzed via 
qualitative coding. The first round of coding used a priori codes based on 
our research questions. The second round of coding used open and axial 
coding, in keeping with a grounded theory approach.25 Analysis was 
conducted using NVivo 10 qualitative data analysis software.26 Using this 
tool, the researcher tags blocks of text with a theme. Based on these tags, 
the software creates a database of quotes indexed by theme and respondent 
group. Iterative, inductive coding was formalized as a coding manual, by 
which data analysis was standardized across respondent groups. In keeping 
with a grounded theoretic approach, the following results are closely derived 
from the data. 
The results of the stakeholder analysis offered a range of perceptions on 
the downstream impact of open data. Due to the exploratory, open-ended 
nature of this study, the analysis covered a broad scope of hopes, concerns 
and expectations about who will use the data, and to what end. Issues related 
to public trust, privacy, race, and social justice were of core interest to this 
work. Additional topics, like safety, commercial actors, and legal issues also 
emerged in the analysis. In this section, we discuss results by theme, and 
offer a sense of the inter-group variation on a given issue. 
 
 24. Respondents were told that the central goal of the session was to hear as many of 
their hopes and concerns as possible. Three themes—public trust, privacy, and race and 
social justice—were of particular interest to this project. Rather than prompting these 
themes directly, the moderator waited to see if they arose naturally from the conversation. 
If any of these topics were not addressed, the moderator made a note of this, then directly 
addressed remaining themes at the end of the session. 
 25. Qualitative coding is an interpretive process of systematically analyzing a text to 
surface themes within it. A priori codes are themes that the researcher brings to the text. 
A grounded theory approach necessitates that these themes arise from the text itself. Open 
coding is the initial process of capturing each theme from a text; axial coding combines 
these open codes into groups. For background on these coding methods, see generally Juliet 
Corbin & Anselm Strauss, Strategies for Qualitative Data Analysis, in BASICS OF 
QUALITATIVE RESEARCH: TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING 
GROUNDED THEORY 85 (4th ed. 2014). 
 26. See What is NVio, QSR INT’L, http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo 
(last visited Sept. 23, 2015). 
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2. Findings 
a) Effects of Open Data Initiative on Public Trust 
Respondents’ primary hope for open data was that it would increase 
transparency in government. Every group touched on this sentiment, 
although the form it took varied. This included hopes for greater 
transparency, the democratization of governance, and the hope to build a 
better society through data-driven policy decisions. Government 
accountability was of keen interest to those in five of the seven stakeholder 
groups. This was expressed in many forms, from oversight on police or 
prison guard actions, to residents fact-checking politicians by looking at the 
same raw data. Some groups, like the civic hackers, presented this hope with 
conviction: “Having the data be open is an incredible source of 
accountability. It is a key to democracy.”27 This group spoke in-depth about 
opportunities for widespread data-literacy, which was viewed as a key 
intermediate step to true accountability. Others, especially privacy 
advocates, and residents in general, held similar hopes while also more 
ambivalent; we outline these concerns further on.  
b) Economic Value Latent in Data 
A commonly stated goal for open data is that it can bolster the local 
economy. Stakeholders—including industry representatives, privacy 
activists, and civic hackers—shared this goal. Some focused on ways open 
data can foster new companies and lead to more jobs, or allow existing 
companies to offer new products. Industry representatives were interested 
in ways that commercial actors improve the quality of data as they use it, 
and cited the potential for a “two-way pipe,” by which companies could add 
value to the data—e.g., with real-time data feeds—and give it back to the 
city.28 One industry representative said data could be used to target their 
marketing: “How do you find out which customers are heavy commuters? 
You just ask the city for all the tapes about license plates.”29 Privacy activists 
and hackers said that businesses could help interpret and make the data 
more usable to everyday people. However, one privacy activist thought that 
while analysis and usability was a valuable role for businesses, it constituted 
a public good that should not be delegated to private actors. Civic hackers 
were hopeful that open data could help smaller, more agile companies 
replace large firms in government procurement.  
 
 27. Focus Group, Civic Hacker Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 28. Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #2 (Mar. 27, 2015). 
 29. Telephone interview, industry representative #1 (Mar. 27, 2015). 
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c) City Management of Open Data Initiative 
Stakeholders asserted a range of expectations for the city in how they 
proceed with the open data initiative. Every group stated that the data 
should be anonymized prior to release. In keeping with the spirit of the 
PRA, there was also a strong conviction that data held by government 
belonged to the public. The groups who most used this data, like industry 
representatives, privacy activists and civic hackers, had specific input for the 
way the data is and should be stored, accessed, formatted, licensed and 
released. These groups stated that the license terms under which the data 
was released should be clearer. The legal advocate and academic shared the 
expectation that the city should limit data collection, and limit its use 
beyond that for which it was collected. Despite potential risks, civic hackers 
and privacy advocates were profoundly opposed to the idea of access 
restrictions, fearing that they would be used against someone with 
legitimate interest in the data. Often, the scope of this conversation moved 
into one about the city as a data custodian: its data storage, retention, and 
deletion processes.  
Multiple groups shared a sense of unease about the city’s ability to 
prevent data spill.30 This concern was echoed by members of the general 
public, who were acutely concerned about hacking and identity theft. Both 
industry and city employees said that the city’s servers are regularly targeted 
by Chinese hackers and other international actors. As we discuss further on, 
both the general public and city employees were concerned that hacked data 
would be used to threaten critical infrastructure. 
There was large variation within and between groups on the feasibility 
of use restrictions on the data, with an overall sense that restrictions would 
not be enforceable. Civic hackers and privacy activists noted the practical 
problems with governing uses of data once it is made open. The legal 
advocate pointed out that some forms of use restrictions would represent 
unconstitutional restraints of free speech. Even in the absence of formal use 
restrictions, industry representatives were sensitive to the way the public 
 
 30. One industry representative said:  
They need to follow reasonable baseline data security practices, 
particularly if the city is going to be a repository of big data. And, if for-
profit companies in the health-care sector, for example, have under-
invested in data security, then it’s a fair bit to say the IT systems of many 
municipal governments aren’t where they should be either. 
Id. 
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would react to different uses.31 Public-facing organizations, as opposed to 
organizations that work business-to-business, were thought to use public 
feedback as a check on data uses. The legal advocate shared this sense, 
adding that data brokers and less visible actors are less responsive to norms 
around data use: “Is anyone really comfortable with the variety of awful 
things that have happened with commercial actors in this space—like 
companies creating extortion schemes by posting photos of people online 
that they get via public records?”32 While use restrictions were generally 
deemed infeasible, this quote illustrates the ambivalence stakeholders 
expressed about unintended consequences of data release. 
d) Privacy Interests in Open Data 
Privacy implications of the open data initiative were a prominent feature 
in every conversation, with the exception of the civic hackers group. Some 
respondents among the general public and civic hackers asserted that 
“privacy is an illusion.”33 Members of these groups strongly believed a data 
spill was liable to happen eventually. However, they were less concerned 
about privacy implications than they were that public outcry would slow the 
momentum of the open data initiative. Civic hackers framed concerns about 
privacy as important, but coeval with concerns about data inaccuracy and 
misinterpretation. Overall, this group shared an impetus to get “more eyes 
on more data”34—data in anonymized form. Some respondents in the 
privacy activist group shared the civic hackers’ confidence that data 
 
 31. One representative said, “We’re very conscious of ethics and big data, civil rights 
and big data, and trying to be really thoughtful about how we combine data so that it isn’t 
used in bad ways or identifies people.” Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #3 
(Mar. 27, 2015). Similarly, another industry representative said: 
[I]t could be useful for commercial benefit if you’re doing that in a de-
identified or aggregated way, and that shouldn’t be a problem. If you’re 
doing it in a personally identifiable way—so the people can add factors 
to your behavioral profile—that’s probably going to rub people the wrong 
way. 
Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #1 (Mar. 27, 2015). 
 32. Interview, Legal Advocate, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 19, 2015).  
 33. Focus Group, Civic Hacker Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 12, 2015). One 
civic hacker said: 
I think that banks and private health care are a much bigger concern for 
privacy problems than the government; they’re a lot more focused. 
[Governments have] bits and pieces of data all over the place, you’d have 
to really want to aggregate that stuff in order to really drill down in 
somebody’s privacy. 
Id. 
 34. Id. 
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anonymization processes are resilient to reverse re-identification. Members 
of the general public and the legal advocate were less confident that data 
anonymization could protect individuals. 
Other stakeholders had more acute privacy concerns. There was a 
general sense that the city had sensitive data. A privacy advocate said, “I fear 
the efforts to make data available about the government actually makes data 
available about the public.”35 The category of what information is or should 
be “private” varied between groups. Members of the general public framed 
private data as social security numbers and information related to financial 
status (e.g., credit rating). An industry representative and civic hackers 
emphasized that locational data would be a privacy concern, if released in a 
granular way. The legal advocate favored an approach that would scrutinize 
any data type as one piece of a larger mosaic: “If it’s a sufficient analysis, it’s 
also going to take into account whether this information, when correlated 
with other data that is available, presents harms.”36 The legal advocate spoke 
to ways that data could be re-identified; thus, he said that entire record types 
should be considered sensitive (e.g., police video) and exempt from 
proactive release or most forms of public records request. 
City employees’ discussion of what constitutes private information was 
broader than that of other groups, due in part to the large amount of 
information the city has in their personnel files. Employees described the 
different standards of privacy that applied to them as public employees. 
They recalled the shock of adjusting to having their salaries posted publicly. 
Members of the group were unaware of whether certain data types were 
protected from public records request under the PRA, for example, home 
address, employee benefits, and retirement information. These respondents 
were also very concerned about the release of insurance information such as 
the identity of their dependents or other family members. 
Multiple respondents within all groups mentioned specific segments of 
the population they perceived as having special privacy interests. Several 
groups, including the general public and civic hackers, mentioned the 
special interests of children and the elderly. One privacy activist said: 
It’s a really privileged position to be able to say that everything 
should be open. People with experiences of different kinds of 
abuse have had to build hiding into their cultural identity—open 
is not just going to work for them.37  
 
 35. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
 36. Interview, Legal Advocate, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 19, 2015). 
 37. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
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Safety concerns were the primary reason cited for these special privacy 
interests. 
e) Safety Risks Latent in Data 
Concerns about safety were more widely held than we had expected, and 
came up in conversations with every group. Respondents were concerned 
about the safety of vulnerable populations. There was concern that children, 
elderly people, and victims of previous crimes would be specifically targeted 
by criminals seeking to assault or con them. These concerns were brought 
up widely, in five out of seven groups. The nature of government services 
means that those in need will be especially present in the data. One City 
employee pointed out ways that police officers’ route information reveals 
domestic violence: “you can find safe houses, individuals that are maybe 
victims that are being involved in their processes and response patterns.”38 
Privacy activists noted that governments also have data on foster children 
and those in child protective services. 
Multiple respondent groups were concerned with the safety implications 
for City employees. First responders were perceived to be at risk of vigilante 
justice. A privacy activist said: 
People have tried to find out where cops live so they can go to 
their houses and do stuff to them. Cops still have personal rights 
and personal privacy rights and stuff too, even though we would 
default to thinking that they don’t go out of their way to respect 
our own.39 
This concern for officers’ safety co-existed with the respondent’s other 
attitudes about police. City employees even referred to a past PRA request 
for police officers’ home addresses that had been granted. They noted that 
this incident had led the fire department to take greater precautions with 
the kinds of identifying information it included in its reports.40 City 
employees also raised the possibility that public data could be used to derive 
route patterns, which could be used by criminals to target officers on their 
daily routine. 
 
 38. Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 9, 2015). 
 39. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
 40. One exchange in this group illustrates these concerns:  
You might get incident information, but you’re not going to have the 
firefighters’ names because then they’re easily looked up. They’re at 
Station X, OK—you can see shift details and stuff, so we have to be smart 
about it. Especially the kinds of shifts firefighters are on—they have to 
leave their families . . . . They’re on 24 hours.  
Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 9, 2015). 
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City employees were also concerned about their safety. Some responded 
that they felt they could be targeted because of their race or sexual 
orientation; one person described a city department’s LGBT group meeting 
wherein another city employee tried to use the PRA to request the names 
of all attendees. The same person reported feeling outed when trying to 
change his or her official marital status.41 Other respondents felt personally 
exposed by ways that public records are indexed and searchable on Google. 
Safety risks were perceived to implicate not only individuals, but larger 
domestic security concerns. Members of the general public, industry 
representatives, and city employees referred to the potential for open data 
to be used to target critical infrastructure. This risk was framed as applying 
to physical infrastructures, like the power grid, as well as servers and other 
digital assets. To the extent that open data could be used to derive first 
response patterns, city employees were concerned that this information 
would be used to divert public safety officers from a planned attack. The 
academic cited a counterexample of the public safety utility of open data, 
especially public health concerns like vaccine and disease status. 
f) Lack of Public Trust in the Management of the Open Data 
Initiative 
Despite these risks, multiple stakeholder groups were concerned that 
the government would not open enough data. Civic hackers, industry 
representatives, privacy activists, and members of the general public shared 
a concern that open data efforts would fall short of its promise if very little 
data were released. Members of the general public and privacy activist 
groups shared a sense that those in city government would selectively record 
or release data to protect their own image. One privacy activist said, “If the 
city . . . maintains the ability to selectively refrain from publishing portions 
of that data, then we’re not a whole lot better off than if they just weren’t 
publishing in the first place.”42 Respondents in the civic hackers group and 
 
 41. This individual responded: 
It doesn’t feel safe to me at all. My being, you know as a, being married, 
I had to contact a lot of people to get my status change in the city. They 
didn’t, you know, so then I’m thinking okay, let’s advertise it even more 
to everybody. I was certainly in my right so I’m going to do it, but it’s 
pretty public. If I wanted to not tell people I was gay, it would have been 
impossible because everybody has access to it.  
Id. 
 42. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
A member of the Seattle residents group said, “This is just something they’re doing to 
appease the general public because there’s an outcry in America. But the police is going to 
be the police . . . as soon as they get some information they don’t want to be publicized, 
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privacy activists were concerned that government actors could edit data, and 
raised the importance of using metadata or a data signature or hash that 
would verify its authenticity. While the responses of the general public and 
privacy activists exhibited low trust in government, civic hackers were more 
interested with issues of data quality. 
Other groups worried that the promise of open data might become 
encumbered. One industry representative thought agencies might lose sight 
of the larger goals surrounding open data. He feared open data would 
become “a compliance exercise where the agencies and the cities will all do 
whatever they have to [do in order to] stop being bothered about it 
anymore.”43 This respondent spoke from a sense that unambitious 
management of the data would pose a missed opportunity. Both civic 
hackers and city employees noted that governments feared exposing 
themselves to liability from data release; for the civic hackers, liability and 
related concerns were framed as barriers to progress. 
g) Perceived Social Justice Implications of Open Data 
Respondents perceived open data as having promise for social justice 
issues. Half of the groups explicitly mentioned “social justice” issues without 
prompting. Even when not referred to explicitly, the implication of open 
data on social justice issues was present in respondents’ ideas about 
government accountability for misconduct. Other references to social justice 
included the possibility of communities using data to advocate for 
themselves (civic hackers), data-driven policy (general public and civic 
hackers), and crowdsourced service requests (e.g., potholes, streetlight 
reports) (industry representatives). While some in the general public group 
felt that open data would have positive and incremental social justice 
implications, one person thought that little would happen in this vein: “I 
think the reality of it is, it’s not going to really affect anybody that’s down 
and out anyway in Washington State, it’s only going to affect the . . . 
powers-that-be anyway.”44 Racial minorities within the general public group 
expressed a sense that open data would not be put to work on their behalf. 
Other groups raised concerns that open data could have negative racial 
and social justice implications. Many of these were related to the potential 
that commercial uses of the data would have a disproportionate impact on 
marginalized communities. One member of the privacy activists said, “I fear 
 
there’s going to be a glitch in it.” Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 
19, 2015). 
 43. Telephone Interview, Industry Representative #4 (Apr. 6, 2015). 
 44. Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 19, 2015). 
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that it would be used to lower property values, redline insurance, et cetera, 
in neighborhoods with high crime rates rather than addressing those issues. 
I’m worried that data about precincts where people don’t vote much could 
lead politicians to write them off.”45 A member of the general public group 
spoke to the ways that data, once open, is copied and persists:  
The information they put on there is a detriment to me because 
I’ve been trying to get, well I just got out. I was released from a 
penitentiary and I’ve been trying to get work and anytime they do 
a background check it’s bringing up shit from like 1996. This is 
2015.46  
Taken together, these responses highlight how uses for open data could 
reify existing social marginalization. 
3. Implications of Stakeholder Assessment 
The open-ended nature of the qualitative stakeholder assessment 
resulted in some findings that we might have expected, some opinions that 
were more widely shared than we would have expected, and some surprises. 
For the purpose of our recommendations, we foreground the following 
results: (1) Multiple groups expressed concern regarding privacy risks latent 
in the data, especially to vulnerable and marginalized populations and city 
employees. Not all stakeholders were confident that anonymization would 
be enough to protect those listed in the data, although each stakeholder 
listed strong anonymization as an expectation for the city. (2) Stakeholder 
groups spoke to positive economic impacts from commercial uses of the 
data, but drew a clear line between these uses and those that were considered 
overly intrusive. Members of the general public were aware of threats to 
privacy from data brokers, which the research team did not expect. (3) City 
employees did not know what aspects of their personal data were protected, 
and they did not feel safe. (4) In thinking about open data, many groups 
spoke more broadly about issues of data custodianship; in their eyes the 
city’s responsibility to protect its data and to open it intertwined. (5) 
Stakeholders were not clear about the terms under which data was released, 
and asked for data licensing, with more clear terms. (6) Respondents were 
concerned about ways that governments might prevent data release to 
protect itself, or might treat different data requestors differently. Our 
recommendations were shaped in part by the application of these findings. 
 
 
 45. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
 46. Focus Group, General Public, in Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 19, 2015). 
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B. QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT II: THE CITY 
Having generated some context for our discussion by connecting with 
residents and other stakeholders, we turn to a discussion of how the City of 
Seattle actually processes and shares data. This section discusses the 
findings of interviews with city departments relevant to municipal data 
management and release.  
1. The City of Seattle as a Case for Study 
One underlying premise of this research is the tension or conflict 
between the adoption of “smart city” technology and the protection of 
privacy and fairness for the individuals and groups who generate the data. 
In this respect, recent events have made Seattle an ideal case for study. On 
February 3, 2015, the City of Seattle formulated and adopted a set of privacy 
principles, which will guide the actions the city takes when collecting and 
using personal information. Central to the principles is the following policy 
statement: “We work to find a fair balance between gathering information 
to provide needed services and protecting the public’s privacy.”47 The six 
privacy principles adopted speak to the importance of keeping personal 
information private when collecting it, storing and using only what is 
needed for city services, and being accountable for “managing your personal 
information in a manner that is consistent with our commitments and as 
required by law.”48 Where possible, the City also commits to updating 
information to be accurate, and notifying citizens on how information is 
used.  
Many Seattle departments have adopted or contracted for the use of 
various smart city technologies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of public services. Smart cities have been defined according to their use of 
large-scale sensor networks to improve the provision of city services.49 As 
Rob Kitchin explains, 
The notion of a ‘smart city’ refers to the increasing extent to which 
urban places are composed of ‘everyware’; that is, pervasive and 
ubiquitous computing and digitally instrumented devices built 
into the very fabric of urban environments (e.g., fixed and wireless 
telecom networks, digitally controlled utility services and 
transport infrastructure, sensor and camera networks, building 
 
 47. CITY OF SEATTLE, PRIVACY PRINCIPLES, http://www.seattle.gov/Documents/
Departments/InformationTechnology/City-of-Seattle-Privacy-Principles-FINAL.pdf. 
Disclosure: One of us assisted Seattle in its formulation of privacy principles through his 
participation in an advisory board. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Kitchin, supra note 8, at 1–2.  
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management systems, and so on) that are used to monitor, manage 
and regulate city flows and processes, often in real-time, and 
mobile computing (e.g., smart phones) used by many urban 
citizens to engage with and navigate the city which themselves 
produce data about their users (such as location and activity).50 
The adoption of these technologies amongst Seattle’s departments, and 
the simultaneous adoption and development of citywide privacy principles, 
signify the tension that exists between the perceived role of the city as a 
custodian, consumer, and distributor of data about residents. Depending on 
the perspective one has, or rationale one adopts, the same categories of data 
may be considered either to be of value to the public—therefore warranting 
public distribution, or of value to the public—meaning it should be kept in 
a secure state with strict controls on access.  
2. Selected Departments: A Sample Size of Eight 
Like virtually all mid- to large-sized municipalities, the City of Seattle 
functions more as a federated system of departments than a hierarchy.51 The 
open data portal in Seattle is the product of activities conducted by the 
Department of Information Technology, which oversees the third-party 
contractor who maintains the portal. However, each department in the City 
governs the data it generates with considerable autonomy.  
With regards to the release of data, departments are also subject to many 
different rules and regulations, from both internal and external sources. The 
Washington PRA, however, applies to all departments.52 Thus, many of the 
City’s units are involved in the release of data.  
The City of Seattle contains thirty-six departments and agencies.53 
Within this population, we selected eight to research: the Department of 
Information Technology; the Department of Planning and Development; 
Finance and Administrative Services; Seattle City Light; the Department 
of Transportation; the Police Department; Parks and Recreation; and the 
Fire Department. A few criteria, generally organized around the principles 
of maximizing internal variation and generalizability, guided our selection. 
In consultation with City staff, departments were selected to represent the 
variety of challenges and approaches cities face as data is pushed, pulled, and 
spilled. Most, but not all of the selected departments, are active users of the 
 
 50. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 51. In comparison to private firms, municipalities appear to be very flat organizations. 
This is due in part to the sheer number of roles and responsibilities mandated for and by 
local government. 
 52. See WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.010(1) (2014). 
 53. See Departments and Agencies, SEATTLE.GOV, http://www.seattle.gov/city
-departments/departments-and-agencies (last visited June 23, 2015). 
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open data portal. Many, but not all, are undergoing rapid changes in data 
management due to the adoption of new information technology. Almost 
all govern at least some data that is understood to be either sensitive or 
confidential, though the characteristics of the data subjects and the 
attributes of those datasets differ considerably. This list includes the 
departments that receive the greatest demand for public disclosure requests, 
but also some that experience very few. They rely on a wide variety of third 
party contractors for information-intensive services. 
Importantly, however, departments were selected to represent the 
variety of technologies and enriched information flows that are the hallmark 
of smart cities. For this purpose, we based selection on a rationale 
categorizing sensors and data subjects as “stationary” or “mobile.” Both a 
sensor and data subject can be stationary, as is the case with advanced meters 
with sensors that automatically record electrical or water use in the home or 
office. The sensitivity of this data is generally a function of its granularity 
over time. A sensor can be stationary while the subject of the data is mobile. 
This is the case in the study and provision of transportation services, which 
track the movements of data subjects. Both the sensor and data subject can 
be mobile. Video cameras hoisted on police patrol cars or pinned on the 
lapels of police officers’ uniforms are examples. This schema is useful for 
beginning to think about ways that information technology advances can 
result in the production of more sensitive data.  
With the eight departments selected, in-person and telephone 
interviews were conducted with departmental personnel in various roles 
associated with the push, pull, and spill of municipal data.  
a) The Department of Information Technology 
Shortly after President Obama signed the 2009 Memorandum on 
Transparency and Open Government,54 the start-up firm Socrata 
approached the Department of Information Technology about purchasing 
its services to support open data. After about a year of conversation, Seattle 
contracted with Socrata and began the process of selecting and examining 
datasets for release to an open data portal.55  
In considering the publication of data, the Department of Information 
Technology uses a classification system with four levels: 
Public Information: Public information can be or currently is 
released to the public. It does not need protection from 
 
 54. Transparency and Open Government, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/TransparencyandOpenGovernment. 
 55. Interview, Department of Information Technology personnel, Seattle, Wash. 
(Jan. 21, 2015). 
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unauthorized disclosure, but does need integrity and availability 
protection controls. This would include general public 
information, published reference documents (within copyright 
restrictions), open source materials, approved promotional 
information and press releases. 
Sensitive Information: Sensitive information may not be 
specifically protected from disclosure by law and is for official use 
only. Sensitive information is generally not released to the public 
unless specifically requested. Although most all of this 
information is subject to disclosure laws because of the City’s 
status as a public entity, it still requires careful management and 
protection to ensure the integrity and obligations of the City’s 
business operations and compliance requirements. It also includes 
data associated with internal email systems and City User account 
activity information. 
Confidential Information: Confidential information is 
information that is specifically protected in all or in part from 
disclosure under the State of Washington Public Disclosure Laws. 
This could include certain personally identifiable information or 
vendor trade secrets.  
Confidential Information Requiring Special Handling: 
Confidential information is specifically protected from disclosure 
by law and subject to strict handling requirements dictated by 
statutes, regulations, or legal agreements. Serious consequences 
could arise from unauthorized disclosure, such as threats to critical 
infrastructure, increased systems vulnerability and health and 
safety, or legal sanctions. Departments handling this category of 
information must demonstrate compliance with applicable 
statutes, regulatory requirements and legal agreements. 
Information in this category could include patient health records 
or student school records.56  
Note that the first level pertains to data the City considers applicable for 
posting as open data (push). The second pertains to data that is subject to 
disclosure by request (pull). The last two levels pertain to confidential data 
for which City staff have “a legal reason to refuse public disclosure.”57  
On the incentives for releasing data, department personnel suggest that 
they try to save costs on public disclosure requests. The message that 
pushing data to an online portal may result in more efficient public 
 
 56. E-mail Communication, Department of Information Technology Personnel (Jun. 
29, 2015). 
 57. Interview, Department of Information Technology Personnel, Seattle, Wash. 
(Jan. 21, 2015). 
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disclosure is reinforced by the PRA, which notes, “The internet provides for 
instant access to public records at a significantly reduced cost to the agency 
and the public. Agencies are encouraged to make commonly requested 
records available on agency web sites.”58 Another rationale for municipal 
open data is the prospect of promoting economic or business growth in the 
city after the Great Recession. Importantly, department personnel also 
express hope that public open data has been anonymized properly. As they 
say, “how do you make a race car go faster? You give it better brakes.”59 
b) The Department of Planning and Development 
One of the early and active participants in the open data portal was the 
Department of Planning and Development.60 Most city datasets that 
concern infrastructure do not pertain to critical infrastructure. Among the 
datasets made public by the Department are Geographic Information 
System (GIS) files that show plans, land use, zoning, critical areas, 
topography, vicinity to park property, landmarks, planning and permits. All 
permits for work done on private property are posted to the open data portal. 
Department personnel describe the postings as “complete,” and they can 
potentially include location, the property owner’s identity, and the work 
performed. 
The Department of Planning and Development, like all departments 
contributing open data, is thought to be the “owner” of the data, and it is 
up to their discretion whether to participate. The rationale behind Planning 
and Development’s decision to participate is common to many departments 
that publicize data. Departments consider “the business case”: is this data 
subject to repeated public disclosure requests? Would the preemptive 
preparation and release of the data through the open data portal save time 
and resources when compared to responding to public disclosure requests?61 
c) Finance and Administrative Services 
In the first analysis of sensitive data for release to the open data portal, 
the Department of Information Technology worked with Finance and 
Administrative Services to assess the risk of making business license data 
publicly accessible. As explained in their risk analysis:  
 
 58. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.520, finding 2010 c 69 (2010). 
 59. Interview, Department of Information Technology Personnel, Seattle, Wash. 
(Jan. 21, 2015). 
 60. Interview, Department of Planning and Development Personnel, Seattle, Wash. 
(Jan. 14, 2015). 
 61. Id. 
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The Department of Finance and Administrative Services has 
developed a process for evaluating datasets against eight principles 
of open data and a risk analysis profile associated with publishing 
the data. The risk analysis defines who the final decision maker 
should be, and who will decide whether or not to publish the 
dataset.62  
The principles the Departments referred to are the “8 Principles of 
Open Government Data,” formulated during a 2007 meeting convened by 
Tim O’Reilly, of O’Reilly Media, and Carl Malamud, of 
Public.Resource.Org, with sponsorship from the Sunlight Foundation, 
Google, and Yahoo.63 The principles formulated by this group assert that 
open government data should be: 
1. Complete: All public data is made available. Public data is data 
that is not subject to valid privacy, security or privilege limitations. 
2. Primary: Data is as collected at the source, with the highest 
possible level of granularity, not in aggregate or modified forms. 
3. Timely: Data is made available as quickly as necessary to 
preserve the value of the data. 
4. Accessible: Data is available to the widest range of users for the 
widest range of purposes. 
5. Machine Processable: Data is reasonably structured to allow 
automated processing. 
6. Non-discriminatory: Data is available to anyone, with no 
requirement of registration. 
7. Non-proprietary: Data is available in a format over which no 
entity has exclusive control. 
8. License-free: Data is not subject to any copyright, patent, 
trademark or trade secret regulation. Reasonable privacy, security 
and privilege restrictions may be allowed.64 
 
 62. City of Seattle Department of Finance and Administrative Services, Open Data 
Candidate Requirements and Risk Evaluation—Business License Data 3 (May 6, 2010), 
http://dropbox.ashlock.us/opengov/seattle/Open%20Data%20Candidate%20Requiremen
ts%20and%20Risk%20Evaluation%20V1%209.docx [hereinafter City of Seattle, Open 
Data Candidate Requirements]. 
 63. Open Government Data Principles, PUBLIC.RESOURCE.ORG (Dec. 8, 2007), 
https://public.resource.org/8_principles.html. 
 64. Id. 
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The Departments also added that customer service personnel 
responsible for constituent requests should be notified.65 Seattle’s risk 
analysis compared each data type in the business license dataset to each of 
these eight principles. Analysis proceeded field by field, noting which were 
to be excluded from release because they contained data for internal use 
only, of a personal nature, or data generated by the system (i.e., data that is 
only of use to those who operate the business registration system). For 
example, analysis of the data under the first of the eight principles revealed 
several fields that contained sensitive data, which should be excluded from 
release.66  
The final recommendations focused on the potential legal risk if a data 
type were released. The Departments recommended publishing part of the 
dataset,67 that is, publishing the dataset without mailing addresses and 
[personal] regulatory information. The analysis recommended that a subset 
of the data be extracted each month, and prepared for output to the open 
data portal. 
The decision to publish the data was influenced by the perceived risks 
inherent in publication. Low-risk data could be published as is, while high-
risk data required “too much data clean up” prior to publication.68 Medium-
risk datasets required exclusion of only certain fields. The business license 
dataset risk analysis concluded with the statement: “The risk for this dataset 
is rated at Medium, therefore the final approver for publishing this dataset 
to data.seattle.gov will be the [Finance and Administrative Services] 
director.”69  
While this example illustrates the reasoning and approach Seattle has 
taken toward releasing datasets on Socrata’s platform, Financial and 
Administrative Services Department personnel note that the effort required 
to release secure data has escalated significantly.70 The department is 
currently working in coordination with several other cities in the Puget 
Sound region on an initiative to convert all business and occupation (B&O) 
tax data to an online portal for processing payments and providing results 
to queries for tax information. While not open data in the same sense as the 
data pushed to the Socrata platform, this initiative also proposes to reduce 
 
 65. City of Seattle, Open Data Candidate Requirements, supra note 62, at 17. 
 66. Id. at 9. 
 67. Id. at 19. 
 68. See, e.g., id. at 9. 
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. Interview, Department of Planning and Development personnel, Seattle, Wash. 
(Jan. 14, 2015). 
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costs to taxpayers by allowing secure, online payment and retrieval of tax 
information. 
d) Seattle City Light 
Seattle City Light is Seattle’s publically owned electric power utility 
company. Currently, most of Seattle’s residences are still outfitted with 
mechanical or relatively simple digital meters for reading and recording the 
rate of electricity consumption.71 Seattle City Light employees take readings 
at the customer’s residence or business location. This method delivers no 
more than six points of data per year, in sync with the utility’s bi-monthly 
billing cycle.72 However, technology in this sector has advanced rapidly, and 
Seattle’s meter system is changing. 
Seattle City Light has implemented three programs on a path toward 
smart metering. In 2008, the utility tried a pilot program with 457 meters 
that relied on cellular technology to provide daily, one-way, communication 
(from the customer’s site to the utility).73 Another estimated 6,000 meters, 
in places the utility describes as “hard to reach,” are using radio frequency 
technology to signal usage to the utility.74 For several years, the utility has 
also operated a program for customers who manage mid- to large-sized 
properties, providing continuous two-way communication through meters 
hooked up to phone lines. Referred to as Seattle Meter Watch, the program 
is part of a larger industry-led initiative, known as the Green Button 
Initiative. Since 2012, the Green Button initiative has been a White House-
led effort to allow consumers to access detailed data about their electricity 
usage, and take advantage of online tools for saving money by managing 
their use. Seattle was the first utility in the nation to be certified under this 
initiative.75  
As part of the utility’s six-year Strategic Plan, Seattle City Light has 
begun to scale up the installation of advanced meters. Unlike the city’s 
mechanical meters, which are simply read to produce one aggregated 
measure of electrical use per household or business address every two 
months, the meters available on the market today allow the option of using 
sensors to disaggregate overall electricity consumption in order to discern 
 
 71. Interview, Seattle City Light Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 29, 2015). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. The Pilot Project Summary and Conclusions are on file with authors. 
 74. Id. 
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the use of identifiable electronic appliances.76 This type of sensor gives users 
and utilities the option of viewing the consequences of appliance use in 
terms of electrical demand in real-time. 
Beyond allowing users to respond to and manage demand, Seattle City 
Light personnel also describe the potential benefits of this new technology 
in terms of the ability to more precisely discern where electricity is flowing, 
to re-route electricity based on this information, to improve the 
management of voltage issues and problems in the system, and to ensure a 
smooth flow of electricity.77 This will also allow the utility to identify more 
precisely where in the system people may be tapping electricity illegally. Of 
course, as all of this data becomes more detailed, reporting electrical 
consumption over time or by appliance, it carries a greater potential to 
compromise the privacy and security of the home and workplace. 
e) Department of Transportation 
Transportation assets are expensive to build, operate, and maintain, and 
until recently, transportation departments have also had to spend inordinate 
amounts of money, time, and labor to simply collect data to estimate how 
much we use the various components of our transportation networks. The 
integration of GPS technology in smart devices on our person or in our cars 
has fundamentally transformed this problem for the Department of 
Transportation from one of costly and time-consuming data collection, to 
one of concern about the privacy implications of collecting and using 
personalized data. For example, the City has contracted the services of 
Parkeon to operate pay stations that accept credit card payments for 
parking,78 and has recently added the services of Pay by Phone, a mobile 
payment vendor. In these cases the vendors develop databases that contain 
vehicle information and the identities of parking permit purchasers. The 
vendor attempts to anonymize the data by removing a subset of fields, and 
feeds the resulting dataset back to the department. 
In regard to travel behavior, we found two opposing approaches to data 
collection underway in the Department. One unit within the Department 
contracts with the fitness software company Strava to provide data 
describing the movements of individuals who have opted in to the use of 
their running and cycling app.79 Another unit in the Department has been 
using, through the vendor Acyclica, Bluetooth and Wi-Fi readers installed 
 
 76. For an explanation of this process, see UWTV, UW Four Peaks -- Shwetak Patel, 
YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nnzzTFs0O2g. 
 77. Telephone Interview, Seattle City Light Personnel (Apr. 7, 2015). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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in public places that automatically read and record the Media Access 
Control (MAC) addresses of multiple devices—i.e., smartphones, laptops, 
and automobile computers—to track the movement of individuals across 
the city. A MAC address is a serial number assigned to a computing device, 
typically during the manufacturing process, to make that device uniquely 
identifiable from all other network devices in the world. When turned on, 
personal computing devices constantly send their MAC addresses in signals 
that perform an electronic handshake with Bluetooth and Wi-Fi routers. In 
this case, Acyclica has been granted permission from the City to install 
readers that “sniff” and send the unique MAC identifier of personal devices 
to the servers of the firm. The firm, in turn, sends the data it collects on 
personal travel behavior to the Department.80 Though people have no 
obvious way of knowing that their movements are tracked by Acyclica’s 
devices, the firm operates a web-based portal that allows anyone with a 
MAC address to retrieve the travel behavior data specific to that device.81  
f) Police Department 
With respect to open data, the Seattle Police Department is a self-
described “manufacturer of data for the public.”82 In terms of the demand 
for data, people have always expressed an interest in police activities, 
listening to police scanners, and requesting incident reports and data from 
911 calls. The Department has adopted multiple technologies with 
implications for the generation of big data: they have a cloud-based service 
that captures citizens’ online reporting, they deploy smart phones, they have 
computers onboard vehicles, they generate in-car video and body camera 
video, and are proposing to develop a data analytics platform with multiple 
applications. The Police Department typically receives three times more 
public record disclosure requests than any other department in the city.83 In 
the first quarter of 2015, the number of requests rose by 400%, to an 
estimated 2,500.84  
Personnel in the Seattle Police Department note that the rising increase 
in demand for public disclosure has coincided with the digitization of files 
and the advent of video recording devices mounted on the dashboards of 
 
 80. Interview, Seattle Department of Transportation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 
10, 2015). 
 81. See Analyzer User Guide, ACYCLICA, https://acyclica.com/support/documentation 
(last visited March 12, 2015). The web portal is available at https://acyclica.com/products/
acyclica-analyzer.  
 82. Interview, Seattle Police Department Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Jan. 14, 2015). 
 83. Interview, Seattle Police Department Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015). 
 84. Id. 
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patrol cars and worn on the bodies of officers.85 Gradual shifts over time 
have allowed public disclosure requests to become anonymous and free of 
charge. Individuals in the department explained that people making public 
disclosure requests used to have to provide a phone number to call, so that 
people would be notified when the documents were ready, or could be called 
to clarify the request. As one interviewee explained: 
[T]he department has moved from paper to electronic, so the 
people think it should be accessible data, they think that a report 
should be available right away, even though there are protocols. 
The types of records [now include] body cams, in-car video, 911 
calls, audio statements in the field, photos, officers receive video, 
text messaging, emails, web browsing. People expect to be able to 
access this information as much as they want in real time.86  
Departmental personnel explained how demands rise “on the back end” 
with the number of public disclosure requests.87 The department receives 
about 125 requests per week. The department employs seven people full-
time to respond to public disclosure requests, plus additional attorneys, 
paralegals, and people dedicated to 911 and video requests.88 Each request 
to the department generates a series of actions and corresponding logs. 
Detectives assigned to the relevant case participate in the process, helping 
review requested information for civilian safety, privacy, officer safety and 
for compliance with numerous other policies and regulations that pertain to 
police records. The personnel involved are “very careful and conscious of the 
fact that we are dealing with victims and the most vulnerable and not on 
their best day.” As they explain, “we want victims to continue to cooperate 
with the department, all weighting this with trying to be as open as we can.” 
People are given the data they have the authority to receive (e.g., victims 
receive different data than the media). When data is not released, officers 
are required to explain the reasons in an exemption log. 
The Police Department is struggling with the demands created by the 
sheer volume of both footage and requests. Specifically, the Department 
must wrestle with privacy concerns stemming from the fact that body 
camera video contains recordings of persons other than the police officer. 
In its most recent move, as part of the recently initiated program using body 
worn video cameras, the department has launched its own YouTube 
 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Work “on the back end” consists of the tasks that Department personnel must 
carry out in order to satisfy a public records request. 
 88. Id. 
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channel.89 Besides posting raw video clips that have been processed for 
public disclosure, the department is blurring video content and deleting 
audio (to “redact” the identity of persons in the video) that has not been 
through the process, and posting these feeds to YouTube to facilitate public 
disclosure, with dates, times and incident numbers so that interested parties 
can see what is available and make more specific requests. 
g) Parks and Recreation 
Seattle Parks and Recreation maintains twenty-six community centers 
and organizes hundreds of volunteers to provide community services and 
events. Those events are attended by thousands of children and adults 
registered in their databases each year.90 The Department takes a 
conservative approach to public disclosure requests. Personnel have been 
successful in redacting the information describing the people who volunteer 
to run and attend their programs and, under the law, the City has the 
discretion to redact considerable amounts of information pertaining to 
juveniles. 
Perhaps as a result of working predominantly with youth and at-risk 
populations, such as special needs children, Department personnel 
expressed the need to be careful when releasing information for public 
consumption.91 The Department has sensitive information about 
employees, volunteers, and adults and youth registered for programs. They 
are aware that the use of personal information, when distributed through 
either open data portals or in response to public disclosure requests, can give 
people the information they would need to be able to harass someone, stalk 
someone, seek revenge, and commit various crimes. Personnel described 
fights between individuals, a person stalking a volunteer, and community 
groups pitted against one another over a controversial park project, as 
examples of circumstances that have precipitated public disclosure requests 
for personal information. Personnel described their success disclosing 
incident reports to requestors, while redacting the information that could 
be used to contact the other party. 
h) Fire Department 
The Seattle Fire Department manages large amounts of data, but has 
not yet gravitated to new information technologies to the degree that Seattle 
City Light, the Department of Transportation, and the Police Department 
 
 89. SPD BodyWornVideo, YOUTUBE, https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCcdSPR
Nt1HmzkTL9aSDfKuA (last visited July 22, 2015). 
 90. Interview, Seattle Parks and Recreation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015). 
 91. Id. 
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have. Unlike other departments, the Fire Department provides emergency 
medical services, and controls the release of medical data in accordance with 
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) 
and related rules and regulations governing personal health information. 
Approximately 80–90% of Fire Department responses to calls are 
medically related.92 In these situations Fire Department personnel produce 
paper and carbon copy medical reports that they input into special HIPAA-
compliant scanning devices. About 200 two-page medical reports have to 
be entered each day.93 Before it is stored in Department databases, data is 
shared and reviewed by the Department, the station that responded to the 
call, and with University of Washington doctors working with the Fire 
Department. It reportedly takes about ninety days before these records enter 
the Department databases. Department personnel suspect that the 
movement to digitize this process is not likely to change the demand for 
public disclosure of these records because requestors have to provide proof 
of identification, such as a scanned copy of a driver’s license, to receive a 
copy of a report.  
 The Fire Department also stores sensitive data that does not pertain to 
HIPAA. And, like other departments, it receives requests that appear 
“frivolous.”94 Interviewees explained that a person could make a targeted use 
of the law to inundate the Department with requests. Even though a request 
appears frivolous, “you are legally required to respond . . . but we can’t 
possibly respond.” The PRA requires a response within five days of every 
request. The fine for missing this window, can reach as much $100 per page, 
per day. “It’s the only hard deadline and [someone] could try to get you to 
trip up and you have to hit respond to those. Some of them could be months’ 
worth of work. [Someone could] then send a message to the council 
threatening to sue and say you are not in compliance with the PRA.”95  
The Fire Department, like other departments, is experiencing pressure 
to release data in the form of public disclosure requests. However, 
accustomed to maintaining medical and other sensitive data on paper and 
specialized electronic systems, this department realizes many such requests 
may not be justifiable.  
3. Analysis 
The one common approach departments have in regards to open data is 
the desire to reduce the financial cost of public disclosure. If pushing data 
 
 92. Telephone Interview, Seattle Fire Department Personnel (Mar. 19, 2015). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
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to the open data portal, a YouTube channel, or a more sophisticated portal 
such as the Green Button initiative, promises to reduce the cost of 
responding to public disclosure requests, then departments generally aim to 
do so. 
Departments differ widely, however, in their pace and degree of 
adoption of smart technologies, and thus they differ in terms of the 
challenges they face in preserving privacy and social justice when data is 
pulled for public disclosure from city files. Departmental personnel 
appeared interested in serving the public interest and fostering transparency. 
Many also share concerns that the PRA can be, or perhaps already is being 
used for, self-interested, wasteful, or harmful purposes. The timing of the 
growth of such requests coincides with the transition from paper to digital 
records, from charging a nominal fee to copy records to providing them at 
no charge, and from named to anonymous requests. The piecemeal 
exemptions to public disclosure that have accrued in the PRA show that 
some departments have tried to solve the problem through the State 
Legislature. The PRA includes a lengthy list of data exempt from release, 
categorizing exemptions based on specifically named attributes (e.g., name, 
address, telephone number) in the data, subjects represented by the data, 
and public programs or other contexts that motivated the public collection 
and disclosure of the data.96 Other departments have taken a slower 
 
 96. The Public Records Act lists types of data exempt from public disclosure and, in 
doing so, either names specific attributes or uses the broader term “personally identifying 
information” to specify the data that are to be exempt. For example, in a section pertaining 
to public utilities and transportation information, exemptions include: 
addresses, telephone numbers, electronic contact information, and 
customer-specific utility usage and billing information in increments less 
than a billing cycle of the customers of a public utility contained in the 
records or lists held by the public utility of which they are customers, 
except that this information may be released to the division of child 
support or the agency or firm providing child support enforcement for 
another state under Title IV-D of the federal social security act, for the 
establishment, enforcement, or modification of a support order. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.330(2) (2014). Further on, in the same section, exemptions 
include: 
The personally identifying information of persons who acquire and use 
transponders or other technology to facilitate payment of tolls. This 
information may be disclosed in aggregate form as long as the data does 
not contain any personally identifying information. For these purposes 
aggregate data may include the census tract of the account holder as long 
as any individual personally identifying information is not released. 
Personally identifying information may be released to law enforcement 
agencies only for toll enforcement purposes. Personally identifying 
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approach to adopting technology, concerned about the very same 
implications. A few have been more deliberative in their service of public 
disclosure requests, taking a more proactive stance of exempting personal 
information from public disclosure requests. 
Interviewees’ conceptions of the market for municipal data varied. 
When favoring the commercial application of open data, interviewees’ 
conceptions of the firm appeared to be aligned with small startups and newly 
created firms. The idea of pushing data to an open platform for commercial 
use is not universally embraced, however. Many interviewees questioned the 
idea that it is possible to favor the interests of some firms, such as small 
startups, over others, when data made open is open to all. Those concerned 
with the differential treatment of firms seemed to have a broader view of 
the market for municipal data, including large, well-apportioned 
organizations. Only the Police Department expressed awareness of the way 
data brokers use publicly disclosed data—an issue raised because of the uses 
of profiles in criminal investigations. Contractual relationships between the 
city and firms cloud these issues. Finance and Administrative Services, for 
example, raised the issue of the unintended spilling of data by the vendors 
under contract to the city to create online data portals. Seattle City Light 
will face the same issues in designing portals for advanced metering data. 
C. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT: OPEN DATA ANALYSIS 
This section explains the technical analyses we conducted on the City 
of Seattle’s current municipal open data. At issue is the question of how the 
city may evaluate, prior to release, the potential for a dataset to compromise 
privacy. 
1. The Problem of Cumulative Risk of Re-Identif ication 
From our initial interviews we learned that most datasets released by the 
City of Seattle on the open data portal had received some scrutiny with 
regard to potential privacy harms. However, the practices in place only 
modeled the risk of data releases for each dataset in isolation.  
As various scholars have found, otherwise innocuous datasets can be 
joined together in ways that result in re-identification and breaches of 
privacy. This simple fact, evidenced by the accomplishments and practices 
of firms that have amassed detailed dossiers on millions of people, is reason 
 
information may be released to law enforcement agencies for other 
purposes only if the request is accompanied by a court order. 
§ 42.56.330(7). 
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to question the ability of a municipality to release any one dataset about 
persons while preserving the anonymity of those persons.97  
Public policy reflects the idea that the potential harm caused by releases 
of personal information is a function of what the combination of two or 
more pieces of information may reveal about an individual. This is expressed 
in various state laws by the way in which they approach Personally 
Identifiable Information (PII),98 typically defined as the combination of two 
or more attributes for the purpose of protecting individuals’ privacy, identity 
and personal safety.99 The City’s policies and regulatory framework for 
governing the release of data generally follow this line of reasoning. As 
illustrated by its release of business license data, the City of Seattle correctly 
and appropriately uses this criterion to manage the issue of potential privacy 
harm in their analysis of each dataset prior to publication. However, this is 
an analysis of a dataset in isolation. 
 The fact that multiple datasets can potentially be joined together using 
matching information in common fields threatens the validity of any risk 
assessment that has been limited to a single set of data. All that an actor 
would have to do to invalidate the claim that the release of any one dataset 
is risk-free is to join it across common fields with identical or similar data. 
 
 97. See Ohm, supra note 11; Narayanan & Shmatikov, supra note 11, at 24–26; Solon 
Barocas & Helen Nissenbaum, Big Data’s End Run around Anonymity and Consent, in 
PRIVACY BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD, 44–75 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 2014). 
 98. Security Breach Notification Chart, PERKINS COIE, https://www.perkinscoie.com/
en/news-insights/security-breach-notification-chart.html (last visited July 21, 2015) 
(providing a full list of state definitions of PII, current as of June 2015). 
 99. See NIST, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY 
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII), http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-122/
sp800-122.pdf. The NIST Guide defines PII to include: 
[A]ny information about an individual maintained by an agency, 
including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or trace an 
individual‘s identity, such as name, social security number, date and place 
of birth, mother‘s maiden name, or biometric records; and (2) any other 
information that is linked or linkable to an individual, such as medical, 
educational, financial, and employment information. 
Id. See also Narayanan & Schmatikov, supra note 11, at 24. Narayanan and 
Schmatikov note:  
PII is surprisingly difficult to define. One legal context is provided by 
breach-notification laws. California Senate Bill 1386 is a representative 
example: its definition of personal information includes Social Security 
numbers, driver’s license numbers, financial accounts, but not, for 
example, email addresses or telephone numbers. These laws were enacted 
in response to security breaches involving customer data that could 
enable identity theft. 
Id. 
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The resulting merged dataset would not have to be a successful join of every 
record in order to be used to re-identify individuals, or to associate persons 
with attributes that threaten to compromise privacy or safety. In other 
words, cities looking to release public data responsibly face the need to 
develop their capacity to assess the privacy posture of collections of datasets 
more globally, encompassing the impact that additional releases may have 
in combination with existing corpuses of publicly, and perhaps privately 
available data.  
2. A Proposed Method of Ex Ante Evaluation  
Our research includes an analysis of the tabular data already released and 
publicly available at Seattle.gov. The research design presented here models 
the methods that could be used to assess the privacy of collections of datasets 
before they are released from municipalities.100  
Someone wishing to identify potential privacy-violating joins must first 
take the step of identifying what joins are possible. Traditional database 
joins involve simply combining records from one table with another based 
on a known shared field. Our aim, however, is to discern the maximum 
possible extent of joins. So, in contrast to traditional approaches, the joins 
we are contemplating combine information, which may not be perfectly 
matched, or may be nominally classified as different. The purpose is to 
produce the greatest possible degree of connections across datasets that have 
been published separately. For example, fields with differing data types, or 
combinations of fields such as latitude and longitude can be joined across 
datasets with a field called “address” if sufficiently overlapping information 
is compared.  
A second step is to then assess identified joins for their potential harms 
to privacy. To accomplish this, some care must be taken to correctly 
categorize and classify the types of information in the datasets. The analysis 
depends on an understanding of the harms made possible through the 
association of different attributes, as they are found in the published datasets 
and joined using the methods described above. Rules and regulations 
governing personally identifiable information offer limited guidance;101 
 
 100. Anyone in the City interested in evaluating an additional dataset prior to release 
would add that dataset to the corpus of existing public data and repeat the analysis. It is 
important to note, however, that our analysis was limited in time and resources. It 
represents a starting point for further research. 
 101. See Narayanan & Schmatikov, supra note 11, at 25 (“What is ‘reasonable’? This is 
left open to interpretation by case law. We are not aware of any court decisions that define 
identifiability in the context of HIPAA.”). 
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empirical cases of re-identification are more likely to inform this part of the 
exercise. 
These two steps are encapsulated in Rob Kitchin’s definitions of 
indexical and attribute data. Indexical data is important because it enables 
attributes to be linked, and often is the data that can be used to identify the 
subject of the attribute.102 Unique identifiers such as passport numbers, 
account numbers, MAC addresses, order and shipping numbers, and 
manufacturing serial numbers are examples of indexical data, as well as 
names, addresses, and zip codes. What people and firms are joining together 
with the use of indexical data are attributes that describe the subjects of the 
data. As Kitchin notes, “Attribute data are data that represent aspects of a 
phenomenon, but are not indexical in nature. For example, with respect to 
a person the indexical data might be a fingerprint or DNA sequence, with 
associated attribute data being age, sex, height, weight, eye colour, blood 
group, and so on.”103 The vast bulk of data in storage are attribute data, and 
because the attributes that may be sensitive in terms of privacy or social 
justice are associated with various indexical fields, this association places 
sensitive data at risk.  
The expansion of indexical fields gives rise to new and more expansive 
datasets, along with rising hazards to privacy and social justice. In addition 
to these factors, the adoption of advanced technologies further thickens the 
flow of information, with more opportunity to join or enrich existing 
datasets with potentially compromising information. Kitchin mentions how 
the ingenuity and economic drive of people and firms to find more and more 
ways to join data has resulted in the expansion of fields considered useful 
for indexing.104 Thus the threat of re-identification with the release of data 
is a moving target. As more variables become useful for indexing, more 
publicly available datasets may be used to join datasets in previously 
unimagined ways. 
One way to operationalize the first step—determining which joins are 
possible—is to turn collections of tabular datasets into network graphs that 
illustrate a variety of strategies for identifying potential joins between 
multiple datasets. This approach casts individual tables (i.e., each a dataset) 
as nodes in a network, connected by lines as identified by a specific join 
identification strategy (e.g., joining tables on the basis of specific indexical 
fields, such as location in space, as identified through latitude and 
longitude). If each separate table were joined on one indexical variable, 
 
 102. See ROB KITCHIN, THE DATA REVOLUTION: BIG DATA, OPEN DATA, DATA 
INFRASTRUCTURES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 8 (2014). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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showing tables as nodes and indexical field data on the lines connecting 
nodes to one another, one could see within the scope of a single diagram 
the possibility for joining multiple datasets. With a diagram showing the 
potential to join multiple datasets along one or more indexical fields, 
determining the possibility of connecting an attribute in one table to an 
attribute in another table could then become a network pathfinding 
operation. The network of datasets resulting from this approach would be 
amenable to the full-range of network analytical methods.105 New datasets 
under consideration for release could be added to the network, and the 
changes in network topology studied with precision. 
The second step—the assessment of the potential for harm from any 
one specific join—is likely to remain somewhat of a human intelligence task. 
This approach segments individual attributes into a continuum of privacy 
and social justice risk. Combining this continuum with a network dataset 
could allow the programmatic identification of instances where connections 
between low-risk attributes (e.g., describing the built environment) and 
high-risk attributes (e.g., describing persons in the built environment) result 
in potential information leaks.  
3. Potential Join Strategies 
We have envisaged several join identification strategies, all of which 
have different characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages with respect to 
quality of results, false positive or negative rates, processing time, and 
computing resources. 
Some of these strategies work at the schema level (i.e., across field names 
or column headings, in the case of tabular data), and compare the names of 
individual fields (e.g., latitude, longitude, address). These strategies may be 
especially useful for inferring links between datasets that are held by a city 
and datasets that may not be wholly obtainable by a city (i.e., held by a third 
party). For example, one could infer a potential join where two tables share 
an “address” column. Other strategies extend the schema comparison 
approach by using natural language processing to identify conceptually 
related terms, inferring matches between fields such as “location” and 
“postal address.” 
Other strategies that are more exhaustive operate at the level of the data 
itself. These include the attempt to join, through exact matching, all fields 
in all datasets. This is computationally expensive, but answers concretely the 
question of where deterministic joins are possible. Other variants of this 
 
 105. An example of an analytical method that could be applied is Dijkstra’s shortest 
path algorithm. See E. W. Dijkstra, A Note on Two Problems in Connexion with Graphs, 1 
NUMERISCHE MATHEMATIK 269 (1959). 
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strategy include spatial joins, for example, that make geometric comparisons 
of the spatial attributes within tables. 
Many more join identification strategies are likely to be employed by 
data brokers, or other would-be users of these datasets. Future work might 
identify additional strategies or integrate ensembles of strategies for 
identifying potential joins, such as using natural language processing 
techniques to perform meaning-based comparisons of all fields in all 
databases.  
4. Analysis and Results 
We implemented several join identification strategies, and used them to 
perform an initial analysis of the datasets that were publicly available from 
the City of Seattle’s open data portal, as of April 1, 2015. At that time, there 
were 235 datasets on the Socrata open data portal from the City of Seattle. 
The strategies we employed include: 
 Exact match of field name 
 Tokenized match of field name components106 
 Levenshtein distance match of field name107 
 Natural language processing match of field name (i.e., 
Wordnet)108 
 Exhaustive exact match of column contents 
 
 106. Technopedia offers the following definition of “Tokenization”: 
Tokenization is the act of breaking up a sequence of strings into pieces 
such as words, keywords, phrases, symbols and other elements called 
tokens. Tokens can be individual words, phrases or even whole 
sentences. In the process of tokenization, some characters like 
punctuation marks are discarded. The tokens become the input for 
another process like parsing and text mining. 
Tokenization, TECHOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/13698/tokenization 
(last visited July 23, 2015).  
 107. The Levenshtein Distance can be defined as “[t]he smallest number of insertions, 
deletions, and substitutions required to change one string or tree into another.” Levenshtein 
Distance, NIST, https://xlinux.nist.gov/dads/HTML/Levenshtein.html (last updated June 
22, 2015); see also Levenshtein, PHP MANUAL, http://php.net/manual/en/function
.levenshtein.php (last visited July 23, 2015) (“The Levenshtein distance is defined as the 
minimal number of characters you have to replace, insert or delete to transform str1 into 
str2.”). 
 108. The Stanford Wordnet Project, http://ai.stanford.edu/~rion/swn/ (last accessed July 
23, 2015) (“By applying a learning algorithm to parsed text, we have developed methods 
that can automatically identify the concepts in the text and the relations between them.”); 
see also Snow et al., Learning Syntactic Patterns for Automatic Hypernym Discovery (2004 
Conference on Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems), http://ai.stanford
.edu/~rion/papers/hypernym_nips05.pdf. 
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 Partial latitude and longitude geometric match of 
geospatial column contents 
Relatedly, we have partial results of an ordering of the individual fields 
found within Seattle’s open datasets. The number of datasets with tabular 
data that could be analyzed (i.e., contained field names and field contents) 
was 204. The City offices contributing to the corpus of open data included: 
City Budget Office; Department of Human Services; Department of 
Neighborhoods; Department of Planning and Development; Seattle Fire 
Department; Office of the City Clerk; Seattle Police Department; Office of 
the Mayor; Seattle City Attorney’s Office; Department of Information 
Technology; Department of Transportation; Finance and Administrative 
Services; Seattle Public Utilities; and the Seattle City Council. 
The datasets contained a wide variety of information, such as building 
permits, electrical permits, land use permits, code violations, surveys of 
residents’ use of information technology, traffic counts, announcements of 
learning programs and events, commute trip reduction surveys, police 
department incident reports, active business licenses, 911 call logs, housing 
emergency responses, logs of police in-car video, grants and funding, 
adopted budgets, and neighborhood matching grant reports. Many were 
inventories of infrastructure assets, such as assets listed for auction, cultural 
spaces, road weather information systems, trails, street parking signs, and 
neighborhood maps. Of note are several datasets on the Socrata portal that 
are produced as part of a performance dashboard for municipal services.109 
Performance dashboard datasets include, for example, pothole complaints 
and repairs, streetlights data, conservation data, planted trees, first arriving 
engines in emergency response, police reported collisions, bus ridership, city 
building energy use data, pea-patch garden registrants, residential 
burglaries, motor vehicle theft, and civil rights performance data. 
a) Joins Using Exact and Flexible Matching Strategies 
As one would expect, exact matching strategies (i.e., exact matches of 
field names, or column headings) for these datasets appear to result in many 
false-negatives, whereas more flexible matching strategies appear to result 
in many more false-positives. For the purpose of demonstrating potential 
flaws in vetting datasets for publication, flexible strategies are important to 
use so as to not overlook valid matches; eliminating false positives manually 
was the price for complete coverage. 
Results from our schema-based join identification strategies suggest a 
great deal of connectivity between datasets on Seattle’s open data portal. 
 
 109. To explore these datasets, and others, see Performance Seattle, SEATTLE.GOV, 
https://performance.seattle.gov. 
  
2015] PUSH, PULL, AND SPILL 1941 
The total number of field names in the corpus of 204 datasets was 3,859, 
and the number of unique field names (a product of exact match of field 
name) was 1,981. Tokenized, the field names in the corpus of datasets 
produced 6,061 parsed names. Among these were many duplicates. 
Eliminating duplicates left 1,828 parsed field names. The Wordnet 
comparison of parsed field names returned thirty-one pairs with 100% 
match, and another 230 pairs with a 50% match.110 For example, forty-six 
fields are named “address.” Given the ubiquity of certain terms such as 
address, as well as other common fields, the number of connectable tables 
results in a network graph that expresses the possibility of joining nearly all 
tables in the set—forming one comprehensive table out of 204. This 
validates the premise that it is possible to recombine data in ways that violate 
the current model for vetting publication of datasets (i.e., assessing datasets 
in isolation). 
Results from our content-based join identification strategies were also 
promising. We performed a many-to-many comparison (i.e., an exhaustive 
comparison of data entries in all cells), using exact matches only, across all 
fields of all datasets. This resulted in a large number of irrelevant matches 
for common objects (e.g., numbers, “true/false,” “yes/no”), and very few 
exact matches for data in cells. This result was expected, since the published 
datasets do not constrain or normalize data in fields. For example, reliance 
on exact matches produces results that suggest “302 N Baker Street” is not 
an exact match to “302 N Baker St.” This supports the notion that using 
broader, more flexible strategies for finding matches and weeding out false 
positives is a useful approach. 
After the exhaustive join on exact matches of field contents, the next 
likely research step was to either use more flexible joining strategies with 
the entire corpus of data, or more targeted joins on the basis of potential 
privacy harm. We opted to implement the latter, through one smaller but 
significant strategy for joins, with the purpose of illustrating some of the 
unusual qualities of local government data. 
b) The Special Relationship Between Municipalities and Spatial 
Data  
The more we studied the open datasets, the more it appeared to us that 
spatial data is highly represented among Seattle’s municipal open datasets. 
We mentioned the commonality of “address” but it is worth noting that 
nearly all of the datasets included spatial data of one kind or another (i.e., 
 
 110. Results show how closely Wordnet’s system believes they are related to one 
another. The parsed field names included in this analysis were all nouns. All other parts of 
speech were excluded.  
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latitude, longitude, block, location, mailing, shape, zip code, acres, area, and 
shape files).  
There is a logical rationale for this observation. If, as employees of 
departments had suggested in interviews, efforts to de-identify datasets 
prior to publication primarily involved the removal of names, telephone 
numbers, and email addresses, while retaining street address (sometimes 
aggregated to the nearest 100 block), zip code, or another similar spatial 
identifier, then spatial data would be more likely to be retained in the 
datasets made public. Also, considering that cities are primarily interested 
in data regarding activities within the spatial boundaries of their 
jurisdiction, and meaningful determinations of demand, supply, and quality 
of services often pertain to the delivery of services across the spatial extent 
of the jurisdiction, spatial data is likely to be a key variable in municipal 
data.  
However, spatial data can also be the means to identify individual home 
and business owners and occupants. Residents are readily identified when 
their name is associated in any publicly available dataset with these 
properties. For example, the City of Seattle includes the names of persons 
on building permit applications in open datasets, and King County (which 
includes the spatial extent of Seattle) maintains a publicly available dataset 
that includes the names of the owners, addresses, and assessed value of the 
properties. 
  
2015] PUSH, PULL, AND SPILL 1943 
 
Figure 1: Results of 5-Meter Spatial Join of Latitude and Longitude Column Contents.111 
On this basis, we conducted a simple spatial join of datasets sharing the 
field names of latitude and longitude. For this procedure, we drew a circle, 
5 meters in diameter around each point in space identified in columns with 
the heading latitude and longitude (both of which were present in 34 of the 
204 tabular datasets available). If the point from one dataset was found 
within the circle of a point from another dataset, this constituted a join 
between the two datasets.112 Joins between two datasets, measured in this 
 
 111. Datasets in Figure 1 are represented by circles with alphanumeric identifiers. 
Datasets are linked to one another in the network graph when six or more location matches, 
in a 5-meter radius of one another, occur between the datasets. Data collected from all 
Tabular datasets on the City of Seattle’s Open Data Portal, as of April 1, 2015.  
 112. Analysis was carried out using PostGIS, with an overall program logic 
instrumented in a combo of Python and Bash. Overview of steps in the analysis: 
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way, are highly likely to be referring to the same parcel or piece of property. 
The results are shown in Figure 1. 
In the figure, nodes correspond to datasets, and are labeled with the 
alphanumeric identifiers of datasets used on the Socrata platform. The lines 
connecting the nodes indicate matches between datasets. Links were 
removed when the number of matches was less than six, thus all lines 
indicate more than six matches between datasets. From this visualization 
one can assume that nearly all tables in this sample of tables (n = 33) will 
have spatial matches. 
The meaningfulness of the match depends on the context of the 
locations matched. Manual inspection of field names and titles of the 
sample datasets suggests that the spatial locations matched are perhaps 
public facilities (e.g., community centers hosting multiple types of events, 
locations of sensors for data collection such as bicycle and other traffic 
counts) but also private facilities (e.g., locations undergoing repeated 
building inspections and permitting procedures, locations identified in 
multiple events such as 911 calls for police and fire). In this research agenda, 
the next step would be to conduct more flexible comparisons where, for 
example, latitude and longitude are geocoded and compared to street 
addresses or other forms of location information. 
c) Attributes on a Continuum of Personalization 
In terms of the potential for privacy harm, a very limited scan of 
attributes amongst datasets, both within and outside municipal open data 
for Seattle, produced a rather rich set of information for the purpose of 
profiling individuals. Limited only to three datasets in Seattle and a fourth 
in King County, these attributes suggest how weaknesses in the ability to 
 
1. Convert lat/lon text strings into WGS84 Geometries (a reference 
datum used by Socrata). 
2. Create new empty geometry field. 
3. Translate points into NAD83(HARN) Washington State Plane N 
format, meter units. 
4. Create 5 meter buffer around points. This value was chosen somewhat 
arbitrarily to allow matches of points that differ only by the floating point 
precision of the lat/lon. This distance was generous enough to smooth 
over any minor discrepancies in parcel size, but conservative enough that 
any identified matches would pretty much be a stones throw from each 
other. 
5. Construct spatial indexes using GiST strategy. 
6. Identify matches based on the condition of intersection between any 
two circular buffers (ST_Intersects function). 
7. Return count of matches. 
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effectively de-identify individuals through the elimination of indexical fields 
and the aggregation of data across space could result in serious consequences 
in terms of privacy and social equity.  
Table 1: Attributes from Four Open Data Sets on a Continuum of Personalization.113 
 Datasets  











Name ● ● ●  
Address/Location ● ●  
Phone Number ●  
Age ●  
Gender ●  
Income ●  
Home Value ●  
Zip Code ●  
Sexual Orientation ●  
Race ●  
Level of Education ●  
Language ●  
Number in Household ●  
Employment ●  
Unpermitted Activity ●  
Internet Use ●  
Uses of Cable ●  
Incident Type/Descrip. ●  
Permitted Activity ●  
Value of Alteration ●  
Permit Type ●  
The City of Seattle datasets represented in Table 1 include permitting 
data from the Department of Planning and Development, Business License 
Data from Financial and Administrative Services, and the Department of 
Information Technology’s survey of resident uses of information technology 
(n = 2900 residents surveyed). King County’s public dataset showing 
property ownership and tax assessment is also included. Note the ability to 
 
 113.  Some fields of Table 1 contain data that may be used to identify persons or infer 
the identity of persons. Some fields contain data that may be used to categorize persons 
into racial, social, or economic groups. Government data contains many additional fields 
of data with as yet unknown implications for privacy. Fields that may be used to identify 
(e.g., name, address) or infer the identity of persons (e.g., age, gender, zip code) are 
indexical, and can be used to join these data into one universal set to form dossiers on 
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join the property value, business license, and permitting databases using the 
names of the property and business owners. This one act brings together 
name and contact information, such as address and phone number.114 While 
there is no obvious overlap of fields between the technology user survey, and 
other datasets, it is worth noting that one of the more popular and widely 
used indexical fields for re-identification is zip code. With the plethora of 
demographic fields provided in the survey dataset, it is not difficult to 
imagine a data broker or similar type of firm using zip code to join and re-
identify survey respondents. At the very least, the privacy implicating and 
highly differentiated fields in the survey could make this dataset a desirable 
target for commercial interests seeking to re-identify subjects and enrich 
their existing dossiers on city residents. 
d) One Simple Example of a Profile 
Finally, to demonstrate the kind of personal profile which can be 
gathered today from open data published by the City of Seattle, we chose a 
single location and produced joins from eight Seattle open datasets. The 
information gathered from these datasets revealed: 
1. Property owner’s full name (multiple spellings) 
2. Multiple major building projects, most with associated 
code violations related to follow-up and/or inspections 
3. Junk storage violations 
4. Vacant building-related issues 
5. A fire in the main structure 
There is enough information in any one of these datasets to join this 
profile with the King County dataset that shows the assessed value of 
property, which may be used as a proxy for wealth or income. The property 
is among those in the city that have received the lowest possible valuation.  
There is distress involved in some of the revealed incidents as well as 
loss of personal property and net worth, all tied to dates, times and a specific 
person’s name. The level of information revealed from the combination of 
these eight open data sets—all indexed using spatial location—is more than 
most individuals would be comfortable with. 
5. Open Data Assessment in Sum 
These technical assessments suggest the extent to which the release of 
multiple, seemingly benign municipal open datasets holds the potential to 
compromise privacy, or pose threats to social justice. The City of Seattle, 
 
 114. This emphasizes the importance of excluding licenses for businesses located in 
residences from open data. 
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however, like many cities in the U.S., governs many more datasets than 
those currently available as open data. Many of those datasets are produced, 
processed, copied, and stored in the information systems of firms under 
contract with the City. 
D. LEGAL ASSESSMENT: VENDOR CONTRACTS 
The preceding section describes risk as a function of technical processes, 
demonstrating how data that is “safe” in isolation may yield more private 
details than anticipated when combined or correlated. In this section, we 
describe risk of another sort: the risk associated with turning over the 
processing and storage of resident data to third party vendors. Cities use 
vendors extensively. And vendors have different capabilities and incentives 
than a municipal government; they may be more or less capable of keeping 
data secure, and are not likely to be as responsive to residents as their city 
government. As our qualitative analysis makes clear, stakeholders will 
ultimately hold cities responsible as custodians and expect them to uphold 
constituent values.  
The relationship between the City of Seattle and its vendors is described 
in its contracts. We therefore undertook an analysis of a carefully selected 
sampling of contracts between the City and its vendors. The goal of this 
research was to determine whether vendors with access to City data—
including data about employees and citizens—were contractually obligated 
to engage in best practices around privacy and security, thus preventing the 
unintended spilling of data. We found that some were, and others were not. 
This does not necessarily mean that any vendor engages in bad behavior, 
only that they do not make commitments that help foreclose the possibility. 
On the basis of this work, we later recommend that the City generate a 
standard contract including privacy and security language to use as a starting 
point for any future outsourcing of data processing, gathering, or storage.  
Among the insights we gleaned from our focus group sessions were that 
residents did not tend to differentiate between the specific constructs of 
open government or public records requests and the city’s role in general as 
a custodian of resident data. The city collects, stores, processes, and in some 
instances shares information. Although we have developed a taxonomy of 
push, pull, and spill in this paper, the picture for residents seems rather less 
differentiated.  
In general, we found that relatively few vendor contracts made 
guarantees around the privacy or security of resident or employee data, and 
that the contracts that did make such guarantees did not use anything like 
the same language. There was no “smoking gun,” in the form of a highly 
irresponsible provision, but there were places where due diligence might 
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have recommended changes to allay stakeholder fears and concerns. The 
findings that follow form the basis of our recommendation, infra Section 
IV.G, that the City develop a standard vendor agreement that incorporates 
baseline or default provisions regarding how information is accessed, shared, 
and secured.  
Residents want to feel as though cities are using information wisely to 
their benefit across the board. Cities do not collect, process, or store 
information on their own. Like all major enterprises, they work with 
partners. Accordingly, the circle of trust regarding municipal data is wider 
than just a city itself—it includes their providers. Cities entrust resident data 
to providers for a variety of purposes, including storage, analysis, and 
connectivity. For example, the City of Seattle Police Department works 
with Evidence.com—a subsidiary of Taser—to store video from police lapel 
cameras. Seattle employees work with Verizon and Motorola to 
communicate. As noted previously, the City’s existing open data portal is 
managed by Socrata. 
The primary means by which cities can maintain its trust with residents 
in light of these partnerships is by getting these providers to agree to a 
comparable level of responsibility and data hygiene. Indeed, the city’s 
relationships with vendors are governed by terms of service, privacy policies, 
and other service agreements.  
We undertook to examine these documents in an effort to assess 
whether they respect privacy and security by their terms. Our method 
involved selecting eighteen particularly important master agreements (plus 
sub-documentation) from five departments. We based this selection on the 
in-depth interviews we conducted with employees across the City. An 
attorney in private practice analyzed the documents according to parameters 
set by a member of our team with deep experience in privacy law, specifically 
including privacy policies and terms of service. That team member then 
reviewed and synthesized the findings for presentation here. 
1. Privacy  
We first looked for language addressing what if any rights the subjects 
of data being processed by the City’s partners may have. In the consumer 
privacy context, such rights generally include understanding what 
information has been collected and why, how it is secured, with whom it is 
shared, and so on. A good benchmark is the set of obligations imposed on 
websites under California’s privacy notice law.115 
 
 115. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2014). See also CALIFORNIA 
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MAKING YOUR PRIVACY PRACTICES PUBLIC: 
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The picture on privacy was mixed. Whereas some providers specifically 
reference the ability of data subjects to access their data (e.g., Paybyphone, 
Volgistics, and Microsoft), many others made no reference to privacy or 
data subjects at all (e.g., Kubra, FileLocal, and MacroCCS).116 Some 
agreements assumed a relationship with the data subject: PayByPhone 
agreed to “provide an easy to use customer account management website.”117 
Other agreements seemed to assume that the City would remain the point 
of contact for data subjects: Microsoft, which hosts and processes a variety 
of City data, committed not to respond to data subject requests absent the 
City’s prior written consent or a legal obligation.118 There was next to no 
language obligating vendors to notify data subjects of anything, except in 
the case of a data breach as discussed in the next section. And long-term 
retention was, if mentioned, framed as a benefit.  
A variety of contracts (e.g., those with CopLogic, Hewitt, and Affirma) 
addressed the privacy-related concept of “confidential information.” 
Confidential information does not always intersect with the sensitive 
information of data subjects.119 For example, the Motorola agreement 
defines it as “any information that is . . . marked, designated, or identified 
at the time of disclosure to [sic] as being confidential.”120 However, 
confidential information can so intersect. CopLogic, a software IT company 
that services the City’s online police reporting system, defines confidential 
information to include certain “City employee information” such as Social 
Security numbers or email addresses.121 Confidential information can also 
include the vendor’s own “ideas, concepts, know-how or techniques,” i.e., 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPING A MEANINGFUL PRIVACY POLICY (May 2014), 
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/cybersecurity/making_your_privacy_practices
_public.pdf. 
 116. Kubra, FileLocal, and MacroCCS jointly service the Washington State Business 
License and Tax Portal Agency, an online portal to pay for business licenses and taxes for 
several Washington cities including Seattle. 
 117. PayByPhone Technologies, Inc. Vendor Contract #2992, § 10 “Ownership and 
Privacy of End User Information,” at 4 (2015) (on file with authors). 
 118. See, e.g., Microsoft Enterprise Agreement Amendment CTM01E68910, § 9 
“Office 365 Security Terms,” Subsection (A) Privacy, at 11 (2013) (on file with authors). 
 119. For two important discussions of the relationship between privacy and 
confidentiality, see Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path: Recovering 
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2007), and Woodrow Hartzog, Reviving 
Implied Confidentiality, 89 IND. L.J. 763 (2014).  
 120. Motorola Solutions, Inc. Blanket Contract 2592, § 32, subsec. 8, at 14–15 (2011) 
(on file with authors). 
 121. Coplogic, Inc. Blanket Contract 2708, § 35.2.1, at 21 (2010) (on file with 
authors). 
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information proprietary to that business.122 Where information is 
designated confidential it may be subject to special protections by 
agreement, including the prospect of an audit of the vendor to ensure they 
are processing the information correctly.  
Two agreements discussed internal measures to ensure that only the 
vendor employees who need access to City data would have it—in general, 
a best practice in consumer privacy. Microsoft committed that “Microsoft 
personnel will not use, process, or disclose customer data without 
authorization,” and further that “Microsoft personnel are obligated to 
maintain the confidentiality of any customer data and this obligation 
continues even after their engagement ends.”123 Volgistics, too, provided 
that “Volgistics customer service employees will have access to customer 
data as needed for the purpose of answering customer support inquiries,” 
and also that “Volgistics accounting staff can only see part of your credit 
card information.”124 No other contract we sampled limited internal access.  
Quite a few agreements mentioned how long information would be 
retained—a typical subject of privacy policies in the commercial context. 
Retention terms varied, with longer retention generally framed as a selling 
point. For example, Socrata, which manages the City’s open data portal, 
advised it would retain City records for six years after the expiration or 
termination of the agreement.125 Socrata also provides that it will keep the 
data at the same geographic location unless the City authorizes a new 
location in writing. Other contracts provided for the return of the data. For 
example, Truven, a health analytics company, committed to “provide to the 
City all City-owned data, property and deliverable . . . in the format 
originally sent to the Vendor by the City or its Data Sources.”126  
Other agreements discussed the conditions under which City data 
would ever be shared with a third party. For the most part, the relevant 
language committed the vendor to hold its subcontractors to the same 
obligations the vendor has to the City. Language such as Oracle’s is 
common: “Any subcontract made by Vendor shall incorporate by reference 
 
 122. Affirma Consulting, Agreement Number CRU 2013-002, § 22, subsec. G, at 11 
(2013) (on file with authors). 
 123. See, e.g., Microsoft Enterprise Agreement Amendment CTM01E68910, § 9 
“Office 365 Security Terms,” subsec. (A)(e), at 11 (2013) (on file with authors). 
 124. Volgistics is a company that offers software-based coordination of volunteers, of 
which the City has many.  
 125. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, § 27 “Review of Vendor Records,” at 24 
(2014) (on file with authors). 
 126. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, § 41.7.5 “Termination,” at 22 (2013). 
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all the terms of this Contract . . . .”127 Confidential information, however 
defined, sometimes enjoyed special protection against disclosure.  
Several vendor agreements at least contemplated the possibility of 
sharing with data with third parties. The Acyclica contract reserved the 
right for the parties to renegotiate data ownership, “specifically with respect 
to reselling of data,”128 whereas Truven required the City to opt out of 
sharing its information with Truven’s MarketScan program and, in doing 
so, give up the “MarketScan contribution discount.”129 We were unable to 
determine whether the City decided to participate in MarketScan, and we 
imagine the data would only be shared in the aggregate in any event. 
A noteworthy feature of many of the contracts was the treatment of 
privacy and security; many contracts did not explicitly address privacy 
concerns by name even though they did so for security. Privacy and security 
are both important abstractions governing the use of data but are 
conceptually distinct enough to warrant separate analysis. 
2. Security 
One of the main concerns of stakeholders—in general, and specifically 
in our study—is the adequacy of security around data. We are all aware of 
major breaches affecting even the most sophisticated institutions. Security 
is one of the venerated Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPs), which 
the FTC and others use as a lodestar for privacy policy.130 A statement of 
security practices is required for websites operating in California, as alluded 
to above, and most states impose obligations on data custodians to notify 
data subjects and the relevant authorities of a breach.131  
The agreements we sampled and reviewed fared better on security than 
privacy. Ten out of eighteen specifically reference the adequacy of data 
security. Several called for security audits or else required vendors to provide 
documentation of their security policies. Claims of security varied in 
specificity. For instance, Parkeon simply states it will take “an appropriate 
 
 127. Oracle America, Inc. Blanket Contract 3025, § 13b, at 4 (2013). 
 128. Acyclica Attachment to the Western Systems Purchase Order, § 2.6.1, at 2 (on 
file with authors). 
 129. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, exhibit B § 13(g), at 6 (2013) (on file with 
authors). 
 130. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN 
THE ELECTRONIC MARKETPLACE (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy-online
-fair-information-practices-electronic-marketplace-federal-trade-commission. 
 131. Forty-seven states have laws on the books governing disclosure of data breaches. 
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standard of due care,”132 whereas others offered specific benchmarks. 
Motorola stated it would treat the city’s data as if it were their own, internal 
data.133 PayByPhone pegged its standard to the robust Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standard.134 And CopLogic offered an attestation 
that a security auditor had tested its system for “common security 
vulnerabilities.”135  
Several companies dealt specifically with the important issue of 
encryption, i.e., storing or communicating information in ways that would 
ordinarily be unintelligible if accessed or intercepted by an unintended 
party.136 Acyclica, a company that collects and processes traffic data, 
promised that the City’s data would be “encrypted to fully eliminate the 
possibility of identifying individuals or vehicles.”137 The health analytics 
firm Truven specified 128-bit Secure Socket Layer (SSL) encryption of 
some data.138 Volgistics also uses SSL for data in transit and storage.139 
Finally, Microsoft uses encryption on data and media that is sent on public 
networks or leaves its facilities.140 Acyclica, Truven, and Volgistics also refer 
to the use of de-identification techniques separate from encryption.  
Many states, including Washington, obligate companies that experience 
data breaches to notify consumers and the authorities within a specified 
time period.141 Regardless, parties are free to delineate additional, legally 
 
 132. Parkeon, Inc. Vendor Contract 1163, Attachment 1 § 5, at 7 (2004) (on file with 
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 133. Motorola Solutions, Inc. Blanket Contract 2592, exhibit A “Data Information 
Security Services,” at 5 (2011) (on file with authors). 
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and Compliance,” at 5 (2015) (on file with authors). 
 135. CopLogic, Inc. Blanket Contract 2708 § 16 “Security,” at 12 (2010) (on file with 
authors). 
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not mention it. 
 137. Acyclica Attachment to the Western Systems Purchase Order, § 2.5.1, at 2. This 
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 138. Truven, Vendor Contract 3150, exhibit B § 15 “Data Communication,” at 6 
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 139. Volgistics Online Form Security and Privacy Policies, “Security Policies,” at 2 
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 141. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010(1). Section 19.255.010(1) states: 
Any person or business that conducts business in this state and that owns 
or licenses computerized data that includes personal information shall 
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consistent terms in the event of a security breach and often do so. In the 
documents we analyzed, we noted that a few vendors committed to 
notifying the City “immediately” (Socrata) or within one business day 
(Parkeon).142 
While state laws may obligate companies to disclose breaches, they do 
not purport to delineate legal responsibility in the event of a breach.143 We 
found that specific vendors attempted to contractually absolve themselves 
of liability should a breach occur. This could occur generally through an 
arbitration agreement (e.g., Tokusaku) or vendors could absolve liability 
quite specifically in the event of a breach. For example, Socrata disclaims all 
damages for loss of data, “whether or not resulting from acts of God, 
communications failure, theft, destruction or unauthorized access to 
Socrata’s records, programs, or services.”144 In contrast, still other vendors 
(e.g., Hewitt and Microsoft), provide for credit monitoring or other “direct 
damages” in the event of a breach. The City itself could be held accountable 
consistent with sovereign immunity.145 
3. Analysis 
The agreements we reviewed were so-called “enterprise” agreements, 
i.e., made between sophisticated parties. It would not necessarily be fair to 
judge agreements between cities and firms against consumer privacy policies 
or terms of use. Thus, we might not expect the agreements to exactly track 
the Fair Information Practice Principles of notice, access, choice, and 
security, or to adhere to the strictures of the California Online Privacy 
Protection Act requiring every website to identify what data it collects and 
 
disclose any breach of the security of the system following discovery or 
notification of the breach in the security of the data to any resident of 
this state whose unencrypted personal information was, or is reasonably 
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person. 
Id. 
 142. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, subsec. 5.2.8, at 16 (2014) (on file with 
authors); Parkeon Vendor Contract 1163, Attachment 1, sec. 5 “Security Standards,” at 7 
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 143. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010(1). 
 144. Socrata, Inc. Blanket Contract 3406, subsec. 17, at 21 (2014) (on file with 
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 145. See Kelso v. Tacoma, 390 P.2d 2 (Wash. 1964) (holding that the State of 
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immunity); see also Locke v. City of Seattle, 172 P.3d 705 (2007). But see Cummins v. 
Lewis County, 133 P.3d 458 (Wash. 2006) (holding that the public duty doctrine still 
applies to the State of Washington). For a discussion of government liability in 
Washington see Michael Tardif & Rob McKenna, Washington State’s 45-Year Experiment 
in Government Liability, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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how it is used and safeguarded,146 even as we employ these standards as 
benchmarks of best practice.  
More so than an individual consumer, however, the City is in a position 
to dictate the terms on which it will transact. Many of those terms—such 
as adequate security—should apply in all of the City’s dealings around 
resident or City data. What we most clearly observed in the vendor contracts 
was a lack of standardization. The city reserves very disparate rights against 
its various vendors, and receives a wide range of positive guarantees. Privacy 
basics—such as notification requirements, security standards (including 
encryption), and internal safeguards against unauthorized access—were not 
specifically delineated in many instances. Companies like Volgistics and 
Microsoft made extensive mention of privacy and security, laying out exact 
terms. But other companies made almost no mention of these.  
This reflects the status of cities as market makers, not market takers. 
Law is not the only modality of regulation. Another is markets: cities can 
and will drive business decisions because they are major potential customers. 
An insistence that municipal vendors in the data space agree to basic 
commitments around privacy and security can make city and citizen data 
more secure all over the country by raising the market bar.  
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Article thus far has described the expectations around, and inner 
workings of, Seattle’s open government initiative and other data processes. 
A final section outlines some tentative recommendations on the basis of 
what the team has learned. Though researched for the City of Seattle, the 
practical nature of the seven recommendations shown in this section could 
be considered valuable to any municipality seeking public trust, privacy, and 
social justice on the road to open data. 
A. INVENTORY DATA ASSETS 
Our first recommendation involves creating a complete inventory of 
datasets, the fields within those datasets, and metadata explaining how the 
information was collected, its purpose and use for the municipality, and any 
other relevant descriptors concerning the proper management and 
disposition of the data. 
While much of this Article has focused on the contents of datasets, the 
topic of metadata should not be ignored. Metadata can provide the 
municipal organizations charged with governing data release with 
 
 146. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22575–22579 (West 2014). 
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information critical to understanding and hopefully acting within the 
municipal and decidedly public context for the data.147 
A common standard for metadata is the Dublin Core, a list of categories 
useful for storing and classifying data. The fifteen fields that comprise the 
core include: title, creator, subject, description, publisher, contributor, date, 
type, format, identifier, source, language, relation, coverage, and rights.148 
Amongst these categories are many fields for metadata that are potentially 
valuable for storing, among other things, records that explain the purpose 
of collecting the data on the part of the responsible department or office, 
the public uses of the data, a description of the anticipated public benefits 
of those uses, the classification of the data (e.g., sensitive, critical 
infrastructure), the nature of the subjects, the sensitivities of the data, 
restrictions on releases, requirements for aggregation prior to release, 
suggested qualifications for note in exemption logs in reply to public 
disclosure requests, a list of the third parties allowed access to the data, the 
allowable uses or restrictions on use of the data by those third parties, 
required security measures, applicable regulations, and a note explaining the 
ex ante and ex post analyses of risk to privacy and social justice conducted 
in relation to the distribution of the data. 
Metadata includes field names. As our technical analysis highlights, 
municipalities and their related government offices (i.e., counties, special 
districts, states) should develop and share a data dictionary—a standardized 
nomenclature for data fields and entries. This tool can provide multiple 
efficiencies. It can assist departments and the public in interpreting and 
using municipal data. Departments will find it easier to locate and identify 
existing information. It can also reduce the chance that work would be 
unnecessarily duplicated, as would occur if someone found it difficult to find 
or properly interpret the datasets that already exist.  
A more exact and shared naming convention can also reduce the time 
and effort needed to determine the risk of harm in releasing datasets to the 
public. In the case of our research, several of our technical strategies were 
designed to simply deal with the fact that no shared lexicon currently exists 
for the field names used by municipal departments. “Address” is just as likely 
to appear as “ADDR,” “Street Address,” and “Location,” and the difference 
creates unnecessary hurdles for ex ante analysis of risk of release. Any effort 
 
 147. For a definition of metadata, see KITCHIN, supra note 102, at 8. 
 148. See About Us, DUBLIN CORE METADATA INITIATIVE, http://dublincore.org (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2015) (“The Dublin Core Metadata Initiative (DCMI) supports shared 
innovation in metadata design and best practices across a broad range of purposes and 
business models.”); Dublin Core Metadata Element Set, DUBLIN CORE METADATA 
INITIATIVE (June 14, 2012), http://dublincore.org/documents/dces. 
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that has to be spent to interpret the existing data is effort that could be saved 
and spent elsewhere. 
B. REQUIRE EACH UNIT TO DEVELOP AND SUBMIT DATA POLICIES 
For cities trying to thread the needle of protection for private and social 
information while enjoying the ability to make other sets of data available 
to the public, operating as a federated system has its benefits and its 
drawbacks. Departments in a federated system will have a diversity of 
strategies that have evolved to implement the policies they have each created 
and tackle the problems they have each encountered. Revealing the 
possibility to one department that they may emulate a practice in another 
may be just the thing to assist departments. In Seattle, for example, some 
departments appeared to be more comfortable than others sorting 
meaningful from frivolous examples of public disclosure requests, and 
denying requests with an explanation filed in their exemption log. 
For Seattle, with newly adopted privacy principles, this is an opportune 
time to learn about the variety of policies departments have already been 
exercising that, whether they realized it or not, have had the effect of 
preserving or compromising privacy and social equity. The Department of 
Information Technology and the Mayor’s Office are intent on delivering a 
citywide privacy policy. The successful implementation of such a policy will 
depend on the ability of people in these departments to discern the degree 
to which each department is already delivering practices that preserve 
privacy and social equity, and to focus attention where it is needed to assist 
departments that may feel overwhelmed by the shift in priorities.  
Consider, in this light, the contrast in notice and consent provided to 
the residents of Seattle from the Department of Transportation’s enlistment 
of the services of Strava and Acyclica. One need not observe the presence of 
a field name in a dataset to realize that the data can be used to identify 
persons. As Montjoye et al. have shown, in their analysis of hourly 
information flow from devices which record and track the movements of 
people in time and space by keying in to the MAC address of personal 
devices (similar to those deployed in Seattle), the traces of mobility left by 
persons across the urban landscape are highly unique.149 With only four data 
points observed in a day, 95% of MAC addresses and persons can be 
identified. Within the spatial scale of a municipality the task of re-
identification is further eased by the classification of municipal land use into 
residential, office, and other forms of commercial space. Only one, or 
 
 149. See generally Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Unique in the Crowd: The Privacy 
Bounds of Human Mobility, SCI. REP. (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC3607247/pdf/srep01376.pdf. 
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perhaps two data points would be needed to identify most individuals: the 
location at time of day when statistically likely to be in residence, and the 
location at time of day when likely to be at school or work.  
With these facts in mind, notice and consent would seem to be among 
the prudent cautionary measures necessary for preserving public trust in the 
privacy-preserving efforts of the Department. Strava’s application does not 
capture the data flow of the entire population, and as an opt-in program the 
data has limitations, yet it is data that participants agree to provide and it 
has proven useful to the Department for the study of travel behavior. 
Acyclica’s data covers more of the population and this fact is due to the lack 
of notice, choice, and related attention to privacy that accompanied the 
installation and contractual arrangements for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth sniffers 
in the public spaces around Seattle. The City can create and test new 
avenues for notice, consent, and choice. People can opt-out of the program 
if they are aware of it and capable of following the instructions to do so. The 
City can also adopt more restrictive policies for permitting the distribution 
of devices for surveillance in public space.  
The next step for the City is to ask how important is the public use for 
which this data is collected, and who should make this determination? If 
the public use is deemed valuable enough to the taxpayer (including all 
ancillary costs envisioned to make the data secure), the next question to ask 
is how relevant this data is—in its entirety—to the public uses for which it 
is collected. One can question the need for a sample of this size, the 
frequency of the collection, the granularity and choice of spatial collection, 
and of course, retention and distribution of the data. If used, for example, 
for traffic operations on congested arterial streets, and such use is sanctioned 
by the public or elected representatives, then the obvious condition that 
should follow is the limitation of the spatial extent of collection. There is 
no need for traffic operations to include the monitoring and evaluation of 
travel behavior in the residential zones of the city, where the ease of 
personally identifying individuals on the basis of time and location is most 
likely. Like the black-out dates that airlines have employed to prevent the 
use of discount travel during peak periods, municipalities should adopt 
black-out zones, to prevent the use of personally identifying surveillance 
technologies. 
What these two cases suggest is also the extent to which a federated 
system lends itself to an ad hoc approach to problems that are holistic in 
nature, such as the problem of analyzing the potential privacy and social 
equity harms involved in data releases. For this, a governance structure is 
needed. 
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C. ESTABLISH NESTED GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE 
Municipalities need structures to more effectively govern the releases of 
data, via push, pull, and spill. They need governance structures that operate 
on more than one level, that emulate the need to coordinate and provide 
some hierarchy to the complex decisions that municipalities must make 
through the release of data.  
A nested governance structure could help municipalities develop 
citywide policies and avoid ad hoc decision-making. Such a structure could 
involve oversight from a municipal decision-making body analogous to an 
Institutional Review Board (IRB), which are convened to review proposed 
academic research involving human subjects. At the department level, such 
a structure would include clear guidance about the types of activities that 
would be exempt from review by the municipal IRB. The activities of 
interest would span the life cycle of data, to collection, use, retention, 
deletion, as well as release. Activities that are not exempt would be elevated 
for review by the IRB.  
Emphasizing the importance of informed, meaningful consent, Barocas 
and Nissenbaum explain that notice and consent are most effectively refined 
through the services of such a review board.150 In their explanation, they 
borrow from the literature on human subject research in medicine, applying 
these basic insights to the broader case of notice and consent for privacy.151 
They acknowledge that patient interactions take place against a backdrop of 
trust, and that consent or waiver should be interpreted narrowly. Quoting 
O’Neill and Manson, they explain that obligations and expectations of 
medical service providers are not discarded when patients consent. Consent 
is requested of subjects in limited ways, for limited times and very specific 
purposes.152 In consenting to an appendectomy, one does not consent to 
other incisions, or to incisions by persons other than the relevant surgeon. 
Furthermore, consent is not required for expected behaviors; it is required 
for behaviors that depart from what is expected. The burden is on the 
researcher or clinician to, in giving notice, “describe clearly the violations of 
norms, standards, and expectations for which a waiver is being asked.”153 In 
applying these insights to the more general problem of privacy amidst big 
data, the authors suggest, “[a] burden is upon the collector and user of data 
to explain why a subject has good reason to consent, even if consenting to 
 
 150. See Barocas & Nissenbaum, supra note 97, at 64. 
 151. Id. at 44–75.  
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data practices that lie outside the norm. That, or there should be excellent 
reasons why social and contextual ends are served by these practices.”154 
In the case of Seattle, we have sought to illustrate the contextual 
circumstances that surround the municipal rush to big data and open data. 
Several departments are adopting technologies that collect rich datasets 
about the people living and working in Seattle. Once collected, the data can 
be subject to public disclosure request, and may be considered for release to 
an open data portal. All of these activities can occur in ways that pay scant 
attention to the potential effect on privacy or social justice from releases of 
data. For example, the “8 Principles of Open Government Data,” used to 
structure the review and release of business license data by the Departments 
of Information Technology and Financial and Administrative Services, 
were designed for the purposes of promoting the release of data. In this 
system of reviewing and releasing data, there is no equivalent guidance in 
practice to safeguard privacy and social justice. 
The process of data review and release is devoid of the contextual and 
subject-oriented privacy protection that Barocas and Nissenbaum define. 
Practices to safeguard privacy and social justice are, in the current process, 
reduced to the evaluation of individual fields within isolated datasets. Given 
this, it is no wonder that public trust in the privacy-preserving actions of 
municipalities remains suspect. We suggest the adoption of a municipal 
IRB, tasked with protecting privacy and social justice, with the authority to 
veto and condition the collection, use, and release of data, and the 
interdisciplinary capability and experience to evaluate the public interest in 
such decisions. Given the countervailing interests of open data and privacy, 
it is worth mentioning that these aims should not be the responsibility of 
the same person or division within a city department. 
IRBs, however, are not needed in every case of review, and the 
Department of Information Technology may seek to produce a list of 
datasets and their fields that may be handled through administrative review 
within the department that owns the data, or exempted from review 
altogether. Municipal IRBs should be called into service only when the data 
subjects are employees of the city, residents, or workers. The IRB can be 
asked to review requests from departments for public release of data to 
portals or online platforms and any accompanying supportive analysis, such 
as an analysis of the nexus between the collection of the data, its public uses, 
the interests of the taxpayer, and privacy and social justice implications. The 
City should also consider using the IRB to evaluate public disclosure 
requests that pose privacy or social justice problems, for which there are no 
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clear exemptions in the PRA. This should result in recommendations 
rendered on a case-by-case basis, yet informed by a body of knowledge of 
preceding cases and their outcomes, as well as ongoing research in the 
rapidly moving field of re-identification. 
D. ESTABLISH AND DISSEMINATE EX ANTE PROTOCOLS FOR PUSH, 
PULL, AND SPILL 
Cities should plan for the fact that departments may want to release data 
by pushing it out to public portals when they should not or that departments 
may inadequately act or invest to prevent the pull or spill of data. One 
effective way to do this is to establish and disseminate protocols for 
investigating datasets, in order to educate departments about how to 
preserve privacy and social equity by curbing or curtailing certain types of 
releases. 
Our suggestions stem from our study of how multiple databases may be 
joined after they have been published. Possibly the simplest approach a city 
could take in a protocol to evaluate releases ex ante would be to 
programmatically perform the same kinds of join strategies which our 
research team did—and perhaps a few others that we did not have time to 
develop. The join strategies would illustrate the overall joins made possible 
with other public datasets (and private ones if available) if the proposed new 
data were to be published. This method would result in two useful artifacts: 
1. The resulting joined dataset, which could highlight 
newly harmful combinations of data made possible with 
the introduction of new data to the existing corpus of 
publically available data. 
2. A network map that shows precisely which fields would 
be used to accomplish joins resulting in privacy harm. 
The same method could be used to discover and eliminate existing 
indexical fields, which cause the greatest degree of correlation across the 
continuum of privacy related attributes in existing datasets. By adopting this 
practice, and relying on as many existing datasets as possible, the City of 
Seattle can reduce the likelihood of, and thus manage the risk associated 
with, the joining of independent datasets in ways which may cause privacy 
harm. 
E. CONDUCT PUBLIC RECORDS AUDIT AND TRAINING 
We recommend based on the above that cities engage in audits and 
training exercises whereby municipalities compare the text of state and 
federal public records acts with what individual departments are doing on 
the ground. In the case of Seattle, the City has protocols in place, by 
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department, on how to respond to PRA requests. However, it is important 
for all employees—not just those with responsibility for responding to 
outside requests—to understand the law and the City’s interpretation of the 
law. This will help reduce uncertainty and fear around the prospect of 
abusive pulls or spills of employee data.  
In our engagements with City employees, we noticed variation in the 
understanding and application of public records requests. First, as noted, 
not all departments adopted the same posture toward a request for 
information. Parks and Recreation, which deals mostly with children and 
families, adopted a relatively restrictive stance.155 The Police Department 
had to come up with entirely novel procedures to accommodate massive 
requests for information in the form of video recordings, and defaulted 
toward sharing everything (with some modifications for privacy).  
We also noticed that employees articulated fears about abusive behaviors 
that should not have been possible under the text of the PRA. The act 
provides an exception, for instance, for personal information about an 
employee.156 Nevertheless, employees worried that other employees or the 
public would gain access to information for the purposes of relationships, 
bias, or embarrassment. When the PRA exception for employee personal 
information was pointed out in an interview, the room erupted in laughter, 
as if to suggest the exception would not be honored.157 
This is not to say that any city should ignore the role of context—it may 
be a good thing that departments do not all react identically to a request for 
information. However, there should be some standardization. In particular, 
all employees involved in responding to public records requests should know 
the exceptions and the reasons behind them, and generally be able to fall 
back on a clearly articulated policy.  
F. EXPLORE CONDITIONED ACCESS OF MUNICIPAL DATA 
We recommend that cities explore vehicles by which to make certain 
data available under specific conditions. This is a fairly common practice. 
Companies, of course, routinely condition access to information on signing 
a nondisclosure agreement. In the public sector, more than twenty states 
condition access to voter databases on noncommercial use.158 Federal 
 
 155. Interview, Seattle Parks and Recreation Personnel, Seattle, Wash. (Mar. 5, 2015). 
 156. WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.230(3) (2014) (“The following personal information 
is exempt from public inspection and copying under this chapter: . . . Personal information 
in files maintained for employees, appointees, or elected officials of any public agency to 
the extent that disclosure would violate their right to privacy.”). 
 157. Focus Group, City Employees, in Seattle, WA (Mar. 9, 2015). 
 158. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 29A.08.720(2). That section directs: 
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election law has similar provisions. As cities open up more and more data, 
they should consider whether one or more use restrictions would be 
appropriate. 
In our focus groups, several citizens and most privacy advocates 
expressed concern over the prospect that the City would push data for 
transparency reasons that would instead be used for commercial or political 
purposes that were disadvantageous to consumers and citizens. Examples 
included lenders writing off neighborhoods with respect to offers of credit 
and politicians ignoring complaints from districts with low political 
participation.159 There is ample evidence that municipal open data is a major 
source for data brokers of all kinds.160 One opportunity might be to follow 
the example of some states and federal agencies around political data and 
condition access to certain data sets on noncommercial or 
nondiscriminatory use. A government might do this when, for instance, 
citizens may be less likely to participate in a given, beneficial activity such 
as voting, donating, or volunteering because they fear it will lead them to be 
targeted for marketing or otherwise cause them to face adverse commercial 
consequences.  
Another example might be conditioning access on the obligation to 
update the information periodically. The issue here is that commercial 
entities may copy databases that then become outdated, either because of a 
mistake (false lien) or because of an update (juvenile record expunged). 
Meanwhile, although the City now has the correct version, companies and 
others may be making decisions on the basis of a copy in the hands of a data 
broker. Presently nothing, apart from industry best practice, obligates these 
data brokers to keep their databases up to date.  
It should be noted that there are a number of pitfalls with this approach. 
The first is that once data has been released, it is hard to follow. The City 
 
The county auditor or secretary of state shall promptly furnish current 
lists of registered voters in his or her possession, at actual reproduction 
cost, to any person requesting such information. The lists shall not be 
used for the purpose of mailing or delivering any advertisement or offer 
for any property, establishment, organization, product, or service or for 
the purpose of mailing or delivering any solicitation for money, services, 
or anything of value. However, the lists and labels may be used for any 
political purpose. 
Id. For a summary of state-by-state codes on conditions pertaining to voter list access, see 
Voter data use terms and conditions, NATION BUILDER, http://nationbuilder.com/voterdata; 
see also Kim Zetter, For Sale: The American Voter, WIRED (Dec. 11, 2003), http://archive
.wired.com/politics/security/news/2003/12/61543?currentPage=all. 
 159. Focus Group, Privacy Activist Organization, in Seattle, Wash. (Feb. 28, 2015). 
 160. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9. 
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might attach rules to its own data but it would have to think through what 
happens downstream. Imagine, for instance, a condition that commercial 
users of political data must certify that they will periodically update that 
data. What if a noncommercial user—a political accountability non-
profit—downloads and reposts the data without restrictions? The City 
would have to look for examples—for instance, in intellectual property 
licensing—for language that follows the data.  
The second is that recent Supreme Court precedent limits the sorts of 
restrictions that governments can place on uses of data. In Sorrell v. IMS 
Health, the Court invalidated Vermont’s attempt to restrict pharmaceutical 
companies ability to use doctors’ prescribing history for marketing 
purposes—a process called “detailing.”161 The Court found Vermont’s 
attempt to prevent such targeting to be an unconstitutional restriction on 
these companies’ speech.  
Note that Vermont did not merely condition access to prescription 
information on using it for a noncommercial purpose. It singled out 
particular speakers to silence. According to the Court, “Vermont’s law 
enacts content- and speaker-based restrictions on the sale disclosure, and 
use of prescriber-identifying information.”162 Specifically, the Court found 
that “the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.”163 Thus, the Court concluded that the law ran afoul of 
constitutional prescriptions of discriminating against viewpoints. Had the 
state instead kept the data itself and released it only on the condition that it 
not be used for commercial purposes, the Court might not have taken issue.  
In general, there may be situations wherein the City wants some types of 
commercial activities—such as the development of a helpful app by a for-
profit start up—but would like to avoid others—such as profiling for 
marketing. These sorts of restrictions are not likely to survive constitutional 
scrutiny in light of Sorrell and other precedent.164 
G. DEVELOP STANDARD VENDOR AGREEMENT 
We further recommend that the City of Seattle—and others, as well—
create a standard vendor agreement to use as a baseline in all future 
contracting around City data. This agreement would lay out in clear and 
simple language the obligations that the vendor takes on by virtue of its 
custody over City data. These include: 
 
 161. Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2672 (2011).  
 162. Id. at 2663. 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id.; see also Discovery Networks v. City of Cincinnati, 507 U.S. 410, 424 (1993) 
(holding that governments may not ban speech merely on the basis that it is commercial). 
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 maintaining the confidentiality of data subjects;  
 restricting access to those within the organization that 
need it; 
 documenting basic digital and physical security; 
 specific notification provisions in the event of a security 
breach;  
 specific delineation of responsibility and liability in the 
event of a security breach; and 
 obligations not to share data in any format absent the 
express consent of the City and/or the data subject, or by 
required operation of law. 
The suggestion is not that the City would use the exact same agreement 
in each instance. We recognize that department needs will vary on the basis 
of the task. Moreover, there may be circumstances when the City or a 
vendor will need to insist on differing terms. Rather, we recommend the 
development of a baseline reference document such that any departure 
would have to be specifically justified.  
Models for such contracts already exist. For example, Microsoft has a 
master service agreement around privacy and data security as part of its own 
vendor toolkit.165 Moreover, there were specific contracts—in particular, 
those of Volgistics and Microsoft—that contained much of the 
recommended language already. And contracts can and do refer to pre-
established standards of security such as PCI—which some vendors already 
mention—and Internal Organization for Standardization and International 
Electrotechnical Commission 27001 (“ISO 27001”) certification. 
Ultimately drafting a model agreement may be a task best suited to 
corporate counsel.  
An ancillary, though important, benefit of a standardized vendor 
agreement would be the effect on the overall market for municipal data. 
Mid to large-size cities such as Seattle with big information needs and 
access to considerable resources have the potential to be market-makers, i.e., 
to drive the market toward best practices in privacy and security. Our review 
of vendor contracts suggests that, with exceptions, the market remains 
immature in this respect. By insisting on a high bar, the City could not only 
help justify the trust of stakeholders but improve the overall data ecosystem. 
We would hope that the City would share any materials it developed with 
other municipalities.  
 
 165. See Supplier Privacy Toolkit, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/about/
companyinformation/procurement/toolkit/en/us/requirements.aspx (last visited July 21, 
2015). 
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V. FUTURE WORK 
This research was motivated by three central questions: does the City of 
Seattle’s open data initiative increase the public trust in city government; 
what kind of legal framing could the City use to capture the benefits of open 
data while addressing legitimate privacy concerns; and what other kinds of 
harms could arise from government release of data? This Article is a first 
step, and much work remains to be done.  
This case study points toward promising future work in the area of open 
data research for municipalities and other related governmental entities. 
Among the research questions raised, we highlight the following: 
Municipalities exist to represent and serve the public, and their 
departments and offices generally share a keen interest in providing benefits 
to the taxpayer, in the form of efficiencies as well as public goods. If open 
data does indeed provide taxpayers with an efficient vehicle for transparency 
and accountability, then there is no reason to question the validity of the 
movement to open data. And yet, the activities the City recorded in data 
collection and released for public and perhaps commercial uses were just as 
likely to focus on residents as they were the government. What public good 
is served when the names of people given building code violations are made 
public? What service is improved by publicizing the names of people 
applying to participate in pea-patch gardening projects? What is the public 
benefit of tracking the movements of people through their devices across 
the neighborhoods of the city? In a more striking case, consider police body-
worn video. The shocking videos of shootings that raise public attention 
toward the activities of police capture, often in full view, the officer as well 
as the suspect. We are shocked in witnessing, during the course of the video, 
how a suspect becomes a victim. When the body worn video (recorded on 
cameras that face forward from the chest or shoulder of the officer) provide 
little more than moving pictures of the residents of the city, one has to ask 
whether this technology genuinely serves the purposes of transparency and 
accountability. If the electric eye is observing only one of these parties, what 
purposes does this fulfill? 
If we presume that the rationale for data collection and use is valid, then 
the question of efficiency comes into focus. As Aaron Wildavsky has noted, 
efficiency does not tell you where to go, only that you should arrive there 
with the least effort.166 On the grounds of efficiency one could question 
whether the use of advanced information technology—with sensors that 
detect, discern, and develop thick flows of information in real-time—
delivers on its promise of efficiency to the taxpayer. What is the empirical 
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evidence that big municipal data collection followed by big data releases (or 
big exemptions from releases by State Legislatures), pushed, pulled or 
spilled, make the City more efficient? When public representatives adopt 
open data policies, releasing data to the wild, we shift the rules of the game 
by making private information public. What are the full economic 
consequences, and how are they distributed amongst the public (who are 
often the subjects of the data), commercial firms (who often request access 
to the data about public subjects) and the municipality (whose aim it is to 
represent the public interest)? What are the distributional consequences—
does release heighten or relieve the public of its oft-laden position at the 
lower end of information asymmetry? 
The push, pull, and spill of data from municipalities can predispose the 
general public and public employees to harms of privacy and social equity. 
With what legal framework might cities be capable of remedying these 
harms, and navigating the contested space of data control and release? Much 
in the case of Seattle may hinge on legal frameworks established by the 
selective intervention of special interests (public and private) in the adoption 
of exemptions to the Washington State PRA at the state level, in addition 
to various privacy-facing federal acts, such as HIPAA. Selective 
intervention in the rules of the game of state disclosure law suggest that the 
existing legal framework for balancing privacy and open data is somehow 
flawed, and this doubt is redoubled through empirically powerful 
examinations of the inability to use existing legal frameworks—predicated 
on achieving anonymity by replacing or redacting PII—to protect 
information that people prefer to keep private. What legal remedies exist, 
and if they were more widespread, would they be sufficient? What remedies 
should exist, and how will we know when they are effective? 
We’ve said a lot here; clearly, there is more to be said on the subject.  
 
